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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Building Reliable Software for Persistent Memory
by
Lu Zhang
Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science (Computer Engineering)
University of California San Diego, 2019
Professor Steven Swanson, Chair
Persistent memory (PMEM) technologies preserve data across power cycles and provide
performance comparable to DRAM. In emerging computer systems, PMEM will operate on the
main memory bus, becoming byte-addressable and cache-coherent. One key feature enabled by
persistent memory is to allow software directly accessing durable data using the CPU’s load/store
instructions, even from the user-space.
However, building reliable software for persistent memory faces new challenges from
two aspects: crash consistency and fault tolerance. Maintaining crash consistency requires the
ability to recover data integrity in the event of system crashes. Using load/store instructions
to access durable data introduces a new programming paradigm, that is prone to new types of
xiii
programming errors. Fault tolerance involves detecting and recovering from persistent memory
errors, including memory media errors and scribbles from software bugs. With direct access, file
systems and user-space applications have to explicitly manage these errors, instead of relying on
convenient functions from lower I/O stacks.
We identify unique challenges in improving reliability for PMEM-based software and
propose solutions. The thesis first introduces NOVA-Fortis, a fault-tolerant PMEM file system
incorporating replication, checksums, and parity for protecting the file system’s metadata and
the user’s file data. NOVA-Fortis is both fast and resilient in the face of corruption due to media
errors and software bugs.
NOVA-Fortis only protects file data via the read() and write() system calls. When an
application memory-maps a PMEM file, NOVA-Fortis has to disable file data protection because
mmap() leaves the file system unaware of updates made to the file. For protecting memory-
mapped PMEM data, we present Pangolin, a fault-tolerant persistent object library to protect an
application’s objects from persistent memory errors.
Writing programs to ensure crash consistency in PMEM remains challenging. Recovery
bugs arise as a new type of programming error, preventing a post-crash PMEM file from recovering
to a consistent state. Thus, we design two debugging tools for persistent memory programming:
PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer. PmemConjurer is a static analyzer using symbolic execution
to find recovery bugs without running a compiled program. PmemSanitizer contains compiler
instrumentation and run-time recovery bug analysis, compensating PmemConjurer with multi-
threading support and store reordering tests.
xiv
Chapter 1
Introduction
Non-volatile memory (NVM) technologies (e.g., battery-backed NVDIMMs [70] and 3D
XPoint [69]) provide data persistence with performance comparable to DRAM. Commercial NVM
products that can operate on the system’s main memory bus alongside DRAMs have debuted1.
We refer to them as non-volatile main memory (NVMM) or persistent memory (PMEM). They
are byte-addressable and cache-coherent. Thus, one key feature of PMEM is to allow software
accessing durable data using CPU’s load/store instructions, even from the user-space, similar
to how software accesses DRAM nowadays. The combination of PMEM and DRAM enables
hybrid memory systems that offer the promise of dramatic increases in storage performance and a
more flexible programming model.
While the performance advantages of PMEM are enticing, for applications dealing with
mission-critical data, a storage system’s reliability is at least as important as performance. Building
reliable software for persistent memory faces new challenges from two aspects: crash consistency
and fault tolerance. Crash consistency is the ability to recover data consistency in the events
of system crashes. Using load/store instructions and cache-line operations to access durable
data and manage persistence introduces a new programming paradigm and that is prone to new
1Intel has released their Optane DC Persistent Memory Modules in April, 2019.
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types of programming errors. Fault tolerance involves detecting and recovering from persistent
memory faults, including media errors and scribbles from software bugs. With direct access using
load/store instructions, file systems and user-space applications have to explicitly manage these
errors, instead of relying on convenient functions from lower I/O stacks. Without enhancing
applications with fault-tolerance capabilities and testing them for crash-consistency bugs, using
persistent memory to store critical data is not reliable.
In this thesis, we investigate software design and debugging techniques that would enhance
the reliability of PMEM-based applications. We first focus on how we should redesign existing
software components (e.g., file systems) and reuse their interfaces to exploit PMEM’s performance
characteristics and accommodate the fault-tolerance challenges it presents. Chapter 2 explains
the key differences between conventional block-based file systems and PMEM file systems from
a reliability perspective. Then, it introduces NOVA-Fortis, a fast and resilient PMEM file system
incorporating replication, checksums, and per-page parity for protecting the file system’s metadata
and the user’s file data.
Besides using a file system interface, persistent memory also enables applications to
operate on durable data directly from the user-space, bypassing the file system. They can achieve
this by memory-mapping (e.g., using mmap() in Linux) a file in a PMEM-enabled file system such
as NOVA-Fortis. Once the operating system creates address mapping, the user-space application
can access the file’s content without going through the file system. This direct-access mode from
user-space is termed DAX. There is a fundamental conflict between DAX-style mmap() and file
system-based fault tolerance: By design, DAX-mmap() leaves the file system unaware of updates
made to the file, making it impossible for the file system to update the protection data for the file.
NOVA-Fortis’ solution is to disable file data protection while the file is mapped and restore it
afterward. This provides well-defined protection guarantees but leaves file data unprotected when
it is memory-mapped. Moving fault-tolerance to user-space programming libraries solves this
problem, but presents challenges since it requires integrating fault tolerance into persistent object
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libraries that manage potentially millions of small, heterogeneous objects.
To provide fault tolerance for future DAX-style, object-oriented applications, Chapter 3
presents Pangolin, a persistent object library that uses a combination of metadata replication,
per-object checksums, parity, and micro-buffering to protect an application’s objects from both
media errors and corruption due to software bugs. Pangolin presents programming interfaces
similar to libpmemobj, a persistent object library maintained by Intel, and automatically enables
fault-tolerance features with its function calls. Compared to libpmemobj, performance is similar,
and Pangolin provides stronger protection, online recovery, and greatly reduced storage overhead
(1% instead of 100%).
Writing programs to ensure crash consistency in PMEM remains challenging. We de-
fine recovery bugs as PMEM-specific programming errors that may cause unrecoverable data
inconsistency after a crash. Developing PMEM applications without recovery bugs requires
programmers to carefully reason about when and in what order data becomes persistent during
the program execution, explicitly insert cache-line flushing and memory ordering instructions
at proper locations in the source code, and implement recovery methods to restore an PMEM
image to a consistent state after a crash. Moreover, it also demands special memory management
mechanisms (e.g., atomic, crash-consistent memory allocation) and transaction algorithms that
are unique to PMEM programming. Adding the required functionality introduces pervasive
changes to existing programming practices, and the subtleties involved open the door to a wide
range of recovery bugs.
These challenges illustrate the need for effective recovery bug detecting tools. However,
most of existing PMEM debugging tools, such as PMemCheck [45], PMReorder [81], and
PMTest [60], share two major limitations: 1) lack of static analysis and 2) poor multi-threading
support. Without static analysis, tools must rely on instrumenting a program and running dynamic
analysis on a finite set of test cases. Therefore, the instrumentation effort and test case quality
significantly limit the testing coverage. Moreover, existing tools often require programmers to
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manually annotate the source code with testing constructs, steepening the learning curve, reducing
code readability and maintainability, and reducing portability. Finally, current PMEM debugging
tools [45, 60, 81] provide little or no support for inter-thread bug analysis. PMemCheck and
PMReorder extend Valgrind [76], which serializes all threads with an emulated CPU, and does
not consider interactions between threads. PMTest also lacks inter-thread analyses.
Chapter 4 describes PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer to overcome the limitations of
existing PMEM debugging tools. PmemConjurer is a static analyzer that employs symbolic
execution to explore a program’s control flow graph and search for recovery bugs. To support
inter-thread analysis, PmemSanitizer provides compiler instrumentation that automatically injects
dynamic diagnosis code into the program. An instrumented program will execute natively
with threading, while PmemSanitizer’s runtime library performs inter-thread analysis and store-
reordering tests. The tools can detect many reproduced bugs in the PMDK2 repository, and they
also discover eight unknown bugs in the example programs of PMDK, a non-trivial amount given
the limited availability of real-life persistent memory prgrams. The PMDK maintainers have
accepted all of our patches to fix them.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by summarizing the three projects and highlighting
their roles in real-life development of PMEM-based applications.
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Chapter 2
The NOVA-Fortis File System
Integrating NVMMs into computer systems presents a host of interesting challenges. The
most pressing of these focus on how we should redesign existing software components (e.g., file
systems) to accommodate and exploit the different performance characteristics, interfaces, and
semantics that NVMMs provide.
Several groups have proposed new file systems [13, 104, 22] designed specifically for
NVMMs and several Windows and Linux file systems now include at least rudimentary support
for them [35, 63, 64]. These file systems provide significant performance gains for data access
and support “direct access” (or DAX-style) mmap() that allows applications to access a file’s
contents directly using load and store instructions, a likely “killer app” for NVMMs.
Despite these NVMM-centric performance improvements, none of these file systems
provide the data protection features necessary to detect and correct media errors, protect against
data corruption due to misbehaving code, or perform consistent backups of the NVMM’s contents.
File system stacks in wide use (e.g., ext4 running atop LVM, Btrfs, and ZFS) provide some or
all of these capabilities for block-based storage. If users are to trust NVMM file systems with
critical data, they will need these features as well.
From a reliability perspective, there are four key differences between conventional block-
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based file systems and NVMM file systems.
First, the memory controller reports persistent memory media errors as non-maskable
interrupts rather than error codes from a block driver. Further, the granularity of errors is smaller
(e.g., a cache line) and varies depending on the memory device.
Second, persistent memory file systems must support DAX-style memory mapping that
maps persistent memory pages directly into the application’s address space. DAX is the fastest
way to access persistent memory since it eliminates all operating and file system code from the
access path. However, it means a file’s contents can change without the file system’s knowledge,
something that is not possible in a block-based file system.
Third, the entire file system resides in the kernel’s address space, vastly increasing
vulnerability to “scribbles” – errant stores from misbehaving kernel code.
Fourth, NVMMs are vastly faster than block-based storage devices. This means that the
trade-offs block-based file systems make between reliability and performance need a thorough
re-evaluation.
We explore the impact of these differences on file system reliability mechanisms by build-
ing NOVA-Fortis, an NVMM file system that adds fault-tolerance to NOVA [104] by incorporating
replication, checksums, and RAID-style parity protection.
In applying these techniques to an NVMM file system, we have developed the principle of
caveat DAXor (“let the DAXer beware”): Applications that use DAX-style mmap() must accept
responsibility for protecting their data’s integrity and consistency.
Protecting and guaranteeing consistency for DAX mmap()’d data is complex and chal-
lenging. The file system cannot fix that and should not try. Instead, the file system should
studiously avoid imposing any performance overhead on DAX-style access, except when abso-
lutely necessary. For data that is not mapped, the file system should retain responsibility for data
integrity.
Caveat DAXor has two important consequences for NOVA-Fortis’ design. The first applies
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to most other NVMM file systems: To maximize performance, applications are responsible for
enforcing ordering on stores to mapped data to ensure consistency in the face of system failure.
The second consequence arises because NOVA-Fortis uses parity to protect file data from
corruption. Keeping error correction information up-to-date for mapped data would require
interposing on every store, imposing a significant performance overhead. Instead, NOVA-Fortis
requires applications to take responsibility for data protection of data while it is mapped and
restores parity protection when the memory is unmapped.
We quantify the performance and storage overhead of NOVA-Fortis’ fault-tolerance
mechanisms and these design decisions and evaluate their effectiveness at preventing corruption
of both file system metadata and file data.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
1. We identify the unique challenges that the caveat DAXor principle presents to building a
fault-tolerant NVMM file systems.
2. We describe a fast replication algorithm called Tick-Tock for NVMM data structures that
combines atomic update with error detection and recovery.
3. We adapt state-of-the-art techniques for data protection to work in NOVA-Fortis and to
accommodate DAX-style mmap().
4. We quantify NOVA-Fortis’ vulnerability to scribbles and develop techniques to reduce this
vulnerability.
5. We quantify the performance and storage overheads of NOVA-Fortis’ data protection
mechanisms.
We find that the extra storage NOVA-Fortis needs to provide fault-tolerance consumes
14.8% of file system space and reduces application-level performance by between 2% and
38% compared to NOVA. NOVA-Fortis outperforms DAX-aware file systems without reliability
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features by 1.5× on average. It outperforms reliable, block-based file systems running on NVMM
by 3× on average.
To describe NOVA-Fortis, we start by providing a brief primer on NVMM’s implications
for system designers, existing NVMM file systems, key issues in file system reliability, and
the NOVA filesystem (Section 2.1). Then, we describe NOVA-Fortis’ (meta)data protection
mechanisms in 2.2. Section 2.3 evaluates these mechanisms, and Section 2.4 presents our
conclusions.
2.1 Background
NOVA-Fortis targets memory systems that include emerging non-volatile memory tech-
nologies along with DRAM. This section first provides a brief survey of NVMM technologies
and the opportunities and challenges they present. Then we describe recent work on NVMM file
systems and discuss key issues in file system reliability. Finally, we provide a brief primer on
NOVA.
2.1.1 Non-volatile Memory Technologies
Modern server platforms have support NVMM in form of NVDIMMs [70, 39] and the
Linux kernel includes low-level drivers for identifying physical address regions that are non-
volatile, etc. NVDIMMs are commercially available from several vendors in form of DRAM
DIMMs that can store their contents to an on-board flash-memory chip in case of power failure
with the help of super-capacitors.
NVDIMMs that dispense with flash and battery backup are expected to appear in systems
soon. Phase change memory (PCM) [57, 84], resistive RAM (ReRAM) [25, 98], and 3D XPoint
memory technology [69] are denser than DRAM, and may enable very large, non-volatile main
memories. Their latencies are longer than DRAM, however, making it unlikely that they will
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fully replace DRAM as main memory. Other technologies, such as spin-torque transfer RAM
(STT-RAM) [51] are faster, but less dense and may find other roles in future systems (e.g., as
non-volatile caches [110]). These technologies are all under active development and knowledge
about their reliability and performance is evolving rapidly.
The 3D XPoint memory technology has already appeared [43]. In addition, all major
memory manufacturers have candidate technologies that could compete with 3D XPoint. Conse-
quently, we expect hybrid volatile/non-volatile memory hierarchies to become common in large
systems.
Allowing programmers to build useful data structures with NVMMs requires CPUs to
make guarantees about when stores become persistent that programmers can use to guarantee
consistency after a system crash [6, 2]. Without these guarantees it is impossible to build data
structures in NVMM that are reliable in the face of power failures [103, 12, 102].
NVMM-aware systems provide some form of persist barrier that allows programmers to
ensure that earlier stores become persistent before later stores. Researchers have proposed several
different kinds of persist barriers [13, 78, 53].
For example, under x86 a persist barrier comprises a clflush or clwb [41] instruction
to force cache lines into the system’s “persistence domain” and a conventional memory fence
to enforce ordering. Once a store reaches the persistence domain, the system guarantees it will
reach NVMM, even in the case of crash. NOVA-Fortis and other NVMM file systems assume
that these or similar instructions are available.
2.1.2 NVMM File Systems and DAX
Several groups have designed NVMM file systems [13, 21, 22, 63, 104] that address the
unique challenges that NVMMs’ performance and byte-addressible interface present. One of
these, NOVA, is the basis for NOVA-Fortis, and we describe it in more detail in Section 2.1.4.
NVMMs’ low latencies make software efficiency much more important than in block-
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based storage devices [7, 9].
NVMM-aware CPUs provide a load/store interface with atomic 8-byte operations rather
than a block-based interface with block- or sector-based atomicity. NVMM file systems can use
these atomic updates to implement features such as complex atomic data and metadata updates,
but doing so requires different data structures and algorithms than block-based file systems have
employed.
Since NVMMs reside on the processor’s memory bus, applications should be able to
access them directly via loads and stores. NVMM file systems provide this ability via direct
access (or “DAX”). DAX allows read and write system calls to bypass the page cache and access
NVMM directly. DAX mmap() maps the NVMM physical pages that hold a file directly into an
application’s address space, so the application can access and modify file data with loads and
stores and use persist barriers to enforce ordering constraints. File systems for both Windows [35]
and Linux [63, 64] support DAX mmap().
DAX mmap() is a likely “killer app” for NVMMs since it gives applications the fastest
possible access to stored data and allows them to build complex, persistent, pointer-based data
structures. The typical usage model would have the application create a large file in an NVMM
file system, use mmap() to map it into its own address space, and then rely on a userspace
library [12, 103, 82] to manage it.
Building persistent data structures that are robust in the face of system and application
failures is a difficult programming challenge and the first inspiration for the caveat DAXor princi-
ple. Building data structures in NVMM requires the application (or library) to take responsibility
for allocating and freeing persistent memory and avoiding a host of new bugs that can arise in
memory systems that combine persistent and transient state [12].
Applications are also responsible for enforcing ordering relationships between stores
to ensure that the application can recover from an unexpected system failure. Conventional
mmap()-based applications use msync() for this purpose. msync() works with DAX mmap(),
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but it is expensive, non-atomic, and only operates on pages. Persist barriers are much faster than
msync() and better-suited to building complex data structures, but they are more difficult to use
correctly.
2.1.3 File System Consistency and Reliability
Apart from their core function of storing and retrieving data, file systems also provide
facilities to protect the data they hold from corruption due to system failures, media errors, and
software bugs (both in the file system and elsewhere).
File systems have devised a variety of different techniques to guarantee system-wide
consistency of file system data structures, including journaling [100, 22], copy-on-write [8, 86, 13]
and log-structuring [87, 88].
Highly-reliable file systems like ZFS [8] and Btrfs [86] provide two key features to protect
data and metadata: The ability to take snapshots of the file system (to facilitate backups) and set
of mechanisms to detect and recover from data corruption due to media errors and other causes.
Existing DAX file systems provide neither of these features, limiting their usefulness
in mission-critical applications. Below, we discuss the importance of each feature and existing
approaches.
Data Corruption
File systems are subject to a wide array of data corruption mechanisms including media
errors that cause storage media to return incorrect values and software errors that store incorrect
data to the media. Data corruption and software errors in the storage stack have been thoroughly
studied for hard disks [91, 5, 90], SSDs [68, 75] and DRAM-based memories [92, 97]. The
results of DRAM-based studies apply to DRAM-based NVDIMMs, but there have been no
(publicly-available) studies of error behaviors in emerging NVMM technologies.
Storage devices use error-correcting codes (ECC) to protect against media errors. Errors
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that ECC detects but cannot correct result in uncorrectable media errors. For block-based storage,
these errors appear as read or write failures from the storage driver. Intel NVMM-based systems
report these media errors via an unmaskable machine-check exception (MCE) (see Section 2.2.1).
Software errors can also cause data corruption. If the file system is buggy, it may write
data in the wrong place or fail to write at all. Other code in the kernel can corrupt file system data
by “scribbling” [54] on file system data structures or data buffers.
Scribbles are an especially critical problem for NVMM file systems, since the NVMM is
mapped into the kernel’s address space. As a result, all of file system’s data and metadata are
always vulnerable to scribbles.
We discuss other prior work on file system reliability as it relates to NOVA-Fortis in
Section 2.2.8.
2.1.4 The NOVA File System
NOVA-Fortis is based on the NOVA NVMM file system [104]. NOVA’s initial design
focused on two goals: Fully exposing the performance that NVMMs offer and providing very
strong consistency guarantees – all operations in NOVA are atomic. Below, we describe the
features of NOVA that are most relevant to our description of NOVA-Fortis.
Each inode in a NOVA file system has a private log that records changes to the inode.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between an inode, its log, and file data. NOVA stores the log
as a linked list of 4 KB NVMM pages, so logs are non-contiguous. To perform a file operation
that affects a single inode, NOVA appends a log entry to the log and updates the pointer to the
log’s tail using an atomic, 64-bit store.
For writes, NOVA uses copy-on-write, allocating new pages for the written data. The log
entry for a write holds pointers to the newly written pages, atomically replacing them in the file.
NOVA immediately reclaims the resulting stale pages.
For complex file operations that involve multiple inodes (e.g., moving a file between
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NOVA inode:
File pages:
Head Tail
chmod write0~8k
File Page 1 File Page 2 File Page 1
write
0~4kInode log:
Inode update File write
Stale Live
Uncommitted
... ... ...
Log entry type:
File page state:
Figure 2.1: NOVA inode log structure - A NOVA inode log records changes to the inode (e.g.,
the mode change and two file write operations shown above). NOVA stores file data outside the
log.
directories), NOVA uses small, fixed-size journals (one per core) to store new tail pointers for all
the inodes and update them atomically.
NOVA periodically performs garbage collection on the inode logs by scanning and
compacting the log. Since the logs do not contain file data, they are shorter and garbage collection
is less critical than in a conventional log-structured file system.
To maximize concurrency, NOVA uses per-CPU structures in DRAM to allocate NVMM
pages and inodes. It also caches inode metadata in DRAM to minimize accesses to NVMM
(which is projected to be slower than DRAM), and uses one DRAM-based radix tree per file to
map file offsets to NVMM pages.
NOVA divides the allocatable NVMM into multiple regions, one region per CPU core. A
per-core allocator manages each of the regions, minimizing contention during memory allocation.
After a system crash, NOVA must scan all the logs to rebuild the memory allocator state.
Since, there are many logs, NOVA aggressively parallelizes the scan. Recovering a 50 GB NOVA
file system takes just over 1/10th of a second [104].
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Figure 2.2: NOVA-Fortis space layout - NOVA-Fortis’ per-core allocators satisfy requests for
primary and replica storage from different directions. They also store data pages and their
checksum and parity pages separately.
2.2 Handling Data Corruption in NOVA-Fortis
Like all storage media, NVMM is subject to data and metadata corruption from media
failures and software bugs. To prevent, detect, and recover from data corruption, NOVA-Fortis
relies on the capabilities of the system hardware and operating system as well as its own error
detection and recovery mechanisms.
This section describes the interfaces that NOVA-Fortis expects from the memory system
hardware and the OS and how it leverages them to detect and recover from corruption. We also
discuss a technique that prevents data corruption in many cases and NOVA-Fortis’ ability to
trade reliability for performance. Finally, we discuss NOVA-Fortis’ protection mechanisms in the
context of recent work on file system reliability.
2.2.1 Detecting and Correcting Media Errors
NOVA-Fortis detects NVMM media errors with the same mechanisms that processors
provide to detect DRAM errors. The details of these mechanisms determine how NOVA-Fortis
and other NVMM file systems can protect themselves from media errors.
This section describes the interface that recent Linux kernels (e.g., Linux 4.10) and Intel
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processors provide via the PMEM low-level NVDIMM driver. Porting NOVA-Fortis to other
architectures or operating systems may require NOVA-Fortis to adopt a different approach to
error detection.
NOVA-Fortis assumes the memory system provides ECC for NVMM that is similar to
(or perhaps stronger than) the single-error-correction/double-error-detection (SEC-DED) scheme
that conventional DRAM uses. We assume the controller transparently corrects correctable errors,
and silently returns invalid data for undetectable errors.
For detectable but uncorrectable errors, Intel’s Machine Check Architecture (MCA) [40]
raises a machine check exception (MCE) in response to uncorrectable memory errors. After the
exception, MCA registers hold information that allows the OS to identify the memory address
and instruction responsible for the exception.
The default response to an MCE in the kernel is a kernel panic. However, recent Linux
kernels include a version of memcpy(), called memcpy mcsafe(), that returns an error to the
caller instead of crashing in response to memory-error-induced MCEs, and allows the kernel
software to recover from the exception. NOVA-Fortis always uses this function when reading
from NVMM and checks its return code to detect uncorrectable media errors. Intel processors do
not provide a mechanism for detecting store failures, and the memory controller transparently
maps around faulty cells. In rare cases (e.g., an MCE occurring during a page fault), MCEs are
not recoverable, and a kernel panic is inevitable.
When the processor hardware detects an uncorrectable media error, it “poisons” a con-
tiguous region of physical addresses. The size of this region is the poison radius (PR) of a media
error. We assume PRs are a power of two in size and aligned to that size. Loads to poisoned
addresses cause an MCE, and all the data in the PR is lost. The poisoned status of a PR persists
across system failures and the PMEM driver collects a list of poisoned PRs at boot. On Intel
processors the poison radius is 64 bytes (one cache line), but after boot, Linux reports poisoned
regions at 512-byte granularity, so NOVA-Fortis uses 512-byte.
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We also assume that NVMM platforms will allow system software to clear a poisoned PR
to make the address range usable again. Intel processors provide this capability via the “Clear
Uncorrectable Error” command that is part of the Advanced Configuration and Power Interface
(ACPI) specification [101].
2.2.2 Tick-Tock Metadata Protection
NOVA-Fortis protects its metadata by keeping two copies of each structure – a primary
and a replica – and adding a CRC32 checksum to both.
To update a metadata structure, NOVA-Fortis first copies the contents of the data structure
into the primary (the tick), and issues a persist barrier to ensure that data is written to NVMM.
Then it does the same for the replica (the tock). This scheme ensures that, at any moment, at least
one of the two copies is correctly updated and has a consistent checksum.
To reliably access a metadata structure NOVA-Fortis copies the primary and replica into
DRAM buffers using memcpy mcsafe() to detect media errors. If it finds none, it verifies the
checksums for both copies. If it detects that one copy is corrupt due to a media error or checksum
mismatch, it restores it by copying the other. If both copies are error free but not identical, the
system failed between the tick and tock phases of a previous update, and NOVA-Fortis copies the
primary to the replica, effectively completing the interrupted update. If both copies are corrupt,
the metadata is lost, and NOVA-Fortis returns an error.
2.2.3 Protecting File Data
NOVA-Fortis adopts RAID-4 parity protection and checksums to protect file data and it
includes features to maximize protection for files that applications access data via DAX-style
mmap().
RAID Parity and Checksums. NOVA-Fortis treats each 4 KB file page as a stripe,
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and divides it into PR-sized (or larger) stripe segments, or strips.
NOVA-Fortis stores a parity strip for each file page in a reserved region of NVMM. It
also stores two copies of a CRC32 checksum for each data strip in separate reserved regions.
Figure 2.2 shows the checksum and parity layouts in the NVMM.
When NOVA-Fortis performs a read, it first copies each strip of data into DRAM using
memcpy mcsafe(), and calculates its checksum. If this checksum matches either stored copy of
the checksum, NOVA-Fortis concludes the file data is correct and updates the mismatched copy
of the checksum if needed.
If neither of the checksums match the read data or a media error occurs, NOVA-Fortis
attempts to restore the strip using RAID-4 parity, and uses the strip’s checksum to determine
if the recovery succeeded. If no other strip in the page is corrupt, recovery will succeed and
NOVA-Fortis restores the target strip and its checksums. If more than one strip is corrupt, the file
page is lost and the read fails.
Writes and atomic parity updates are simple since NOVA-Fortis uses copy-on-write for
data: For each file page write, NOVA-Fortis allocates new pages, populates them with the written
data, computes the checksums and parity, and finally commits the write with an atomic log
appending operation.
Caveat DAXor: Protecting DAX-mmap’d Data. By design, DAX-style mmap() lets
application modify file data without involving the file system, so it is impossible for NOVA-Fortis
to keep the checksums and parity for read/write mapped pages up-to-date. Instead, NOVA-Fortis
follows the caveat DAXor principle and provides the following guarantee: The checksums and
parity for data pages are up-to-date at all times, except when those pages are mapped read/write
into an application’s address space.
We believe this is the strongest guarantee that NOVA-Fortis can provide on current
hardware, and it raises several challenges. First users that use DAX-mmap() take on responsibility
for detecting and recovering from both media errors (which appear as SIGBUS in user space)
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Figure 2.3: Scribble size and metadata bytes at risk - Replicating metadata pages and taking
care to allocate the replicas separately improves resilience to scribbles.
and scribbles. This is an interesting challenge but beyond the scope of this chapter. Second,
NOVA-Fortis must be able to tell when a data page’s checksums and parity should match the data
it contains and when they might not.
To accomplish this, when a portion a file is mmap()’d, NOVA-Fortis records this fact
in the file’s log, signifying that the checksums and parity for the affected pages are no longer
valid. NOVA-Fortis only recomputes the checksums and parity for dirty pages on msync() and
munmap(). On munmap(), it adds a log entry that restores protection for these pages when the
last mapping for the page is removed. If the system crashes while pages are mapped, the recovery
process will identify these pages while scanning the logs, recompute checksums and parity, and
add a log entry to mark them as valid.
Design Decisions and Alternatives. Using RAID parity and checksums to protect file
data is similar to the approach that ZFS [8] and IRON ext3 [83] take, but we store parity for each
page rather than one parity page per file [83], and we maintain per-strip checksums instead of a
single checksum for a whole stripe [8].
NOVA-Fortis chooses RAID-4 over RAID-5 because RAID-5 intermingles parity and
data and would make DAX mmap() impossible since parity bits would end up in the application’s
address space.
19
Alternately, NOVA-Fortis could rely on RAIM [65], Chipkill [38], or other advanced
ECC mechanisms to protect file data. These techniques would improve reliability, but they are
not universally available and cannot protect against scribbles.
2.2.4 Minimizing Vulnerability to Scribbles
Scribbles pose significant risk to NOVA-Fortis’ data and metadata, since a scribble can
impact large, continuous regions of memory. We are not aware of any systematic study of the
prevalence of these errors, but scribbles, lost, and misdirected writes are well-known culprits for
file system corruption [54, 109, 26]. In practice, we expect that smaller scribbles are more likely
than larger ones, in part since the bugs that result in larger scribbles would be more severe and
more likely to be found and fixed.
To quantify the risk that these errors pose, we define bytes-at-risk (BAR) for a scribble as
the number of bytes it may render irretrievable.
NOVA-Fortis packs log entries in to log pages, and it must scan the page to recognize
each entry. Without protection, losing a single byte can corrupt a whole page. For replicated log
pages, a scribble that spans both copies of a byte will corrupt the page. To measure the BAR for a
scribble of size N we measure the number of pages each possible N-byte scribble would destroy
in an aged NOVA-Fortis file system.
Figure 2.3 shows the maximum and average metadata BAR for a 64 GB NOVA-Fortis
file system with four protection schemes for metadata: “no replication” does not replicate
metadata; “simple replication” allocates the primary and replicas naively and tends to allocate
lower addresses before higher address, so the primary and replica are often close; “two-way
replication” separates the primary and replica by preferring low addresses for the primary and
high addresses for the replica; and “dead-zone replication” extends “two-way” by enforcing a
1 MB “dead zone” between the primary and replica. The dead zone can store file data but not
metadata. The more separation the allocator provides, the less likely a scribble will corrupt a pair
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of mirrored metadata pages. Figure 2.2 shows an example of NOVA-Fortis two-way allocator
with dead zone separation. For each pair of mirrored pages, the dead zone forbids the primary
and replica from becoming too close, but data pages can reside between them.
To stress the allocator’s ability to place the primary and replica far apart, we aged the
file system by spawning multiple, multi-threaded, Filebench workloads. When each workload
finishes, we remove about half of its files, and then restart the workload. We continue until the
file system is 99% full.
The data show that even for the smallest 1-byte scribble, the unprotected version will lose
up to a whole page (4 KB) of metadata and an average of 0.06 pages. With simple replication,
scribbles smaller than 4 KB have zero BAR. Under simple replication, an 8 KB scribble can
corrupt up to 4 KB, but affects only 0.04 pages on average.
Two-way replication tries to allocate the primary and replica farther apart, and it reduces
the average bytes at risk with an 8 KB scribble to 2.9×10–5 pages, but the worst case remains
the same because the allocator’s options are limited when space is scarce.
Enforcing the dead zone further improves protection: A 1 MB dead zone can eliminate
metadata corruption for scribbles smaller than 1 MB. The dead zone size is configurable, so
NOVA-Fortis can increase the 1 MB threshold for scribble vulnerability if larger scribbles are a
concern.
Scribbles also place data pages at risk. Since NOVA-Fortis stores the strips of data pages
contiguously, scribbles that are larger than the strip size may causes data loss, but smaller scribbles
do not. NOVA-Fortis could tolerate larger scribbles to data pages by interleaving strips from
different pages, but this would disallow DAX-style mmap(). Increasing the strip size can also
improve scribble tolerance, but at the cost of increased storage overhead for the parity strip.
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2.2.5 Preventing Scribbles
The mechanisms described above let NOVA-Fortis detect and recover from data corruption.
NOVA-Fortis can borrow a technique from WAFL [54] and PMFS [22] to prevent scribbles by
marking all of NVMM as read-only and then clearing Intel’s WriteProtect Enable (WP) bit to
disable all write protection when NOVA-Fortis needs to modify NVMM. Clearing and re-setting
the bit takes ∼400 ns on our systems.
The WP approach only protects against scribbles from other kernel code. It cannot prevent
NOVA-Fortis from corrupting its own data by performing “misdirected writes,” a common source
of data corruption in file systems [3].
2.2.6 Relaxing Data and Metadata Protection
Many existing file systems can trade off reliability for improved performance (e.g., the
data journaling option in Ext4). NOVA-Fortis can do the same: It provides a relaxed mode that
relaxes atomicity constraints on file data and metadata.
In relaxed mode, write operations modify existing data directly rather than using copy-
on-write, and metadata operations modify the most recent log entry for an inode directly rather
than appending a new entry. Relaxed mode guarantees metadata atomicity by journaling the
modified pieces of metadata. These changes improve performance and we evaluate their impact
in Section 2.3.
2.2.7 Protecting DRAM Data Structures
Corruption of DRAM data structures can result in file system corruption [19, 109], and
NOVA-Fortis protects most of its critical DRAM data structures with checksums. Most DRAM
structures that NOVA-Fortis does not protect are short lived (e.g., the DRAM copies we create
of metadata structures) or are not written back to NVMM. However, the allocator state is and
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exception and it is vulnerable to corruption. The allocator protects the address and length of each
free region with checksums, but it does not protect the pointers that make up the red-black tree
that holds them, since we use the kernel’s generic red-black tree implementation.
2.2.8 Related and Future Work
Below, we describe proposed “best practices” for file system design and how NOVA-Fortis
addresses them. Then, we describe areas of potential improvement for NOVA-Fortis.
Is NOVA-Fortis Ferrous?
InteRnally cONistent (IRON) file systems [83] provide a set of principles to that lead to
improved reliability. We designed NOVA-Fortis to embody these principles:
Check error codes. Uncorrectable ECC errors are the only errors that the NVMM
memory system delivers to software (i.e., via MCEs). NOVA-Fortis uses memcpy mcsafe() for
all NVMM loads and triggers recovery if it detects an MCE. NOVA-Fortis also interacts with the
PMEM driver that provides low-level management of NVDIMMs. For these calls, we check and
respond to error codes appropriately.
Report errors and limit the scope of failures. NOVA-Fortis reports all unrecoverable
errors as EIO rather than calling panic().
Use redundancy for integrity checks and distribute redundancy information. NOVA-
Fortis’ tick-tock replication scheme stores the checksum for each replica with the replica, but it is
careful to allocate the primary and replica copies far from one another. Likewise, NOVA-Fortis
stores the parity and checksum information for data pages separately from the pages themselves.
Type-aware fault injection. For testing, we built a NOVA-Fortis-specific error injec-
tion tool that can corrupt data and metadata structures in specific, targeted ways, allowing us to
test NOVA-Fortis’ detection and recovery mechanisms.
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Figure 2.4: File operation latency - NOVA-Fortis’ basic file operations are faster than competing
file systems except in cases where the other file system provides weaker consistency guarantees
and/or data protection.
Areas for Improvement
There are several additional steps NOVA-Fortis could take to further improve reliability.
We do not expect any of them to have a large impact on performance or storage overheads.
Sector or block failures in disks are not randomly distributed [4], and errors in NVMM
are also likely to exhibit complex patterns of locality [67, 97]. For instance, an NVMM chip may
suffer from a faulty bank, row, or column, leading to a non-uniform error distribution. Or, an
entire NVDIMM may fail.
NOVA-Fortis’ allocator actively separates the primary and replica copies of metadata
structures to eliminate logical locality, but it does not account for how the memory system maps
physical addresses onto the physical memory. A layout-aware allocator could, for instance, ensure
that replicas reside in different banks or different NVDIMMs.
NOVA-Fortis cannot keep running after an unrecoverable MCE (since they cause a
panic()), but it could recover any corrupted data during recovery. The PMEM driver provides a
list of poisoned PRs on boot, and NOVA-Fortis can use this information to locate and recover
corrupted file data during mount. Without this step, NOVA-Fortis will still detect poisoned
metadata, since reading from a poisoned PR results in a recoverable MCE, and NOVA-Fortis
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Figure 2.5: NOVA-Fortis random read/write bandwidth on NVDIMM-N - Read bandwidth
is similar across all the file systems except Btrfs, and NOVA-Fortis’ reliability mechanisms
reduces its throughput by between 14% and 19%.
reads all metadata during recovery. Poisoned file data, however, could accumulate over multiple
unrecoverable MCEs, increasing the chances of data loss.
Finally, NOVA-Fortis does not scrub data or metadata. PMEM detects media errors on
reboot, but if a NOVA-Fortis file system ran continuously for a long time, undetected media errors
could accumulate. Undetected scribbles to data and metadata can accumulate during normal
operation and across reboots.
2.3 Performance Trade-offs
NOVA-Fortis’ reliability features improve its resilience but also incur overhead in terms
of performance and storage space. This section quantifies these overheads and explores the
trade-offs they allow.
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Figure 2.6: NOVA-Fortis latencies for NVDIMM-N - Protecting file data is usually more
expensive than protecting metadata because the cost of computing checksums and parity for
data scales with access size.
2.3.1 Experimental Setup
We implemented NOVA-Fortis for Linux 4.10, and use the Intel Persistent Memory
Emulation Platform (PMEP) [22] to emulate different types of NVMM and study their effects
on NVMM file systems. PMEP supports configurable latencies and bandwidth for the emulated
NVMM, and emulates clwb instruction with microcode. In our tests we configure the PMEP with
32 GB of DRAM and 64 GB of NVMM, and choose two configurations for PMEP’s memory
emulation system: We use the same read latency and bandwidth as DRAM to emulate fast
NVDIMM-N [89], and set read latency to 300 ns and reduce the write bandwidth to 1/8th of
DRAM to emulate slower PCM. For both configurations we set clwb instruction latency to 40 ns.
We compare NOVA-Fortis against five other file systems. Ext4-DAX, xfs-DAX and PMFS
are the three DAX-enabled file systems. None of them provides strong consistency guarantees
(i.e., they do not guarantee that all operations are atomic), while NOVA does provide these
guarantees. To compare to a file system with stronger guarantees, we also compare to ext4 in
data journaling mode (ext4-dataj) and Btrfs running on the NVMM-based block device. Ext4 and
xfs keep checksums for metadata, but they do not provide any recovery mechanisms for NVMM
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media errors or protection against stray writes.
2.3.2 Performance Impacts
To understand the impact of NOVA-Fortis’ reliability mechanisms, we begin by measuring
the performance of individual mechanisms and basic file operations. Then we measure their
impact on application-level performance.
We compare several version of NOVA-Fortis: We start with our baseline, NOVA, and
add metadata protection (“MP”), data protection (“DP”), and write protection (“WP”). “Relaxed
mode” weakens consistency guarantees to improve performance and provides no data protection
(Section 2.2.6).
2.3.3 Microbenchmarks
We evaluate basic file system operations: create, 4 KB append, 4 KB write, 512 B
write, and 4 KB read. Figure 2.4 measures the latency for these operations with NVDIMM-N
configuration. Data for PCM has similar trends.
Create is a metadata-only operation. NOVA is 1.9× to 5× faster than the existing file
systems, and adding metadata protection increases the latency by 47% compared to the baseline.
Append affects metadata and data updates. Adding metadata and data protection increase the
latency by 36% and 100%, respectively, and write protection increases the latency by an additional
22%. NOVA-Fortis with full protection (i.e., “w/ MP+DP+WP”) is 59% slower than NOVA.
For overwrite, NOVA-Fortis performs copy-on-write for file data to provide data atomicity
guarantees, and the latency is close to that of append. For 512 B overwrite, NOVA-Fortis has
longer latency than other DAX file systems since its requires reading and writing 4 KB. Full
protection increases the latency by 2.2×. Relaxed mode is 3.8× faster than NOVA since it
performs in-place updates. For read operations, data protection adds 70% overhead because it
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Table 2.1: Application benchmarks
Application Data size Notes
Filebench-fileserver 64 GB R/W ratio: 1:2
Filebench-varmail 32 GB R/W ratio: 1:1
Filebench-webproxy 32 GB R/W ratio: 5:1
Filebench-webserver 32 GB R/W ratio: 10:1
RocksDB 8 GB db bench’s overwrite test
MongoDB 10 GB YCSB’s 50/50-read/write
Exim 4 GB Mail server
SQLite 400 MB Insert operation
TPC-C 26 GB The ’Payment’ query
verifies the data checksum before returning to the user.
Figure 2.6 breaks down the latency for NOVA-Fortis and its reliability mechanisms. For
create, inode allocation and appending to the log combine to consume 48% of latency, due
to inode/log replication and checksum calculation. For 4 KB append and overwrite, data
protection has almost the same latency as memory copy (memcpy nocache), and it accounts for
31% of the total latency in 512 B overwrite.
Figure 2.5 shows FIO [1] measurements for the multi-threaded read/write bandwidth
of the file systems. For writes, NOVA-Fortis’ relaxed mode achieves the highest bandwidth.
With sixteen threads, metadata protection reduces NOVA-Fortis bandwidth by 24% compared
to the baseline, data protection reduces throughtput by 37%, and enabling all of NOVA-Fortis’
protection features reduces bandwidth by 66%. For reads, all the file systems scale well except
Btrfs, while NOVA-Fortis data protection incurs 14% overhead on 16 threads, due to checksum
verification.
2.3.4 Macrobenchmarks
We use nine application-level workloads to evaluate NOVA-Fortis: Four Filebench [99]
workloads (fileserver, varmail, webproxy, and webserver), two key-value stores (RocksDB [24]
and MongoDB [71]), the Exim email server [23], SQLite [96], and TPC-C running on Shore-
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Figure 2.7: Application performance on NOVA-Fortis - Reliability overheads and the benefits
of relaxed mode have less impact on applications than microbenchmarks (Figures 2.4 and 2.5).
MT [50]. Fileserver, varmail, webproxy and Exim are metadata-intensive workloads, while other
workloads are data-intensive. Table 2.1 summarizes the workloads.
Figure 2.7 measures their performance on our five comparison file systems and several
NOVA-Fortis configurations, normalized to the NOVA throughput on NVDIMM-N. NOVA-Fortis
outperforms xfs-DAX and ext4-DAX by between 3% and 4.4×. PMFS shows similar performance
to NOVA on data-intensive workloads, but NOVA-Fortis outperforms it by a wide margin (up
to 350×) on metadata-intensive workloads. Btrfs provides reliability features similar to NOVA-
Fortis’, but it is slower: NOVA-Fortis with all its protection features enabled outperforms it
by between 26% and 42×. NOVA-Fortis achieves larger improvement on metadata-intensive
workloads, such as varmail and Exim.
Adding metadata protection reduces performance by between 0 and 9% and using the WP
bit costs an additional 0.1% to 13.4%. Enabling all protection features reduces performance by
between 2% and 38%, with write-intensive workloads seeing the larger drops. The figure also
shows that the performance benefits of giving up atomicity in file operations (“Relaxed mode”)
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are modest – no more than 6.4%.
RocksDB sees the biggest performance loss with NOVA-Fortis with all protections
enabled because it issues many non-page-aligned writes that result in extra reads, writes, and
checksum calculation during copy-on-write. Relaxed mode avoids these overheads, so it improves
performance for RocksDB more than for other workloads.
For the PCM configuration, fileserver, webserver and Rocks-DB show the largest perfor-
mance drop compared to NVDIMM-N. Fileserver and RocksDB are write-intensive and saturate
PCM’s write bandwidth. Webserver is read-intensive and PCM’s read latency limits performance.
Btrfs outperforms other DAX file systems on Rocks-DB because this workload does not call
fsync frequently, allowing it to leverage the page cache.
Compared to other file systems, NOVA-Fortis is more sensitive to NVMM performance,
because it has lower software overhead and reveals the underlying NVMM performance more
directly. Overall, NOVA outperforms other DAX file systems by 1.75× on average, and adding
full protection reduces performance by 12% on average compared to NOVA.
2.3.5 NVMM Storage Utilization
Protecting data integrity introduces storage overheads. Figure 2.8 shows the breakdown of
space among (meta)data structures in an aged, 64 GB NOVA-Fortis file system. Overall, NOVA-
Fortis devotes 14.8% of storage space to improving reliability. Of this, metadata redundancy
accounts for 2.1% and data redundancy occupies 12.7%.
2.4 Conclusion
We have used NOVA-Fortis to explore the unique challenges that improving NVMM
file system reliability presents. The solutions that NOVA-Fortis implements provide protection
against media errors and corruption due to software errors.
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File parity: 11.1%
File data: 82.4%
File checksum: 1.56%
Replica log: 2.0%
Replica inode: 0.1%
Unused: 0.75%
Primary inode: 0.1%
Primary log: 2.0%
Figure 2.8: NVMM storage utilization - Extra storage required for reliability is highlighted
to the right. Protecting data is more expensive that protecting metadata, consuming 12.7% of
storage compared to just 2.1% for metadata.
The extra storage required to implement these changes is modest, but their performance
impact is significant for some applications. In particular, the cost of checking and maintaining
checksums and parity for file data incurs a steep cost for both reads and writes, despite our use of
very fast (XOR parity) and hardware accelerated (CRC) mechanisms. Providing atomicity for
unaligned writes is also a performance bottleneck.
These costs suggest that NVMM file systems should provide users with a range of
protection options that trade off performance against the level of protection and consistency. For
instance, NOVA-Fortis can selectively disable checksum based file data protection and the write
protection mechanism. Relaxed mode disables copy-on-write.
Making these policy decisions rationally is currently difficult due to a lack of two pieces
of information. First, the rate of uncorrectable media errors in emerging NVMM technologies is
not publicly known. Second, the frequency and size of scribbles has not been studied in detail.
Without a better understanding in these areas, it is hard to determine whether the costs of these
techniques are worth the benefits they provide.
Despite these uncertainties, NOVA-Fortis demonstrates that NVMM file system can
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provide strong reliability guarantees while providing high performance and supporting DAX-style
mmap(). It also makes a clear case for developing special file systems and reliability mechanisms
for NVMM rather than blithely adapting existing schemes: The challenges NVMMs presents are
different, different solutions are appropriate, and the systems built with these differences in mind
can be very fast and highly reliable.
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Chapter 3
The Pangolin Library
A key feature of NVMM is support for direct access, or DAX, that lets applications
perform loads and stores directly to a file that resides in NVMM. DAX offers the lowest-possible
storage access latency and enables programmers to craft complex, customized data structures
for specific applications. To support this model, researchers and industry have proposed various
persistent object systems [12, 103, 82, 59, 36, 66, 48, 14].
Building persistent data structures presents a host of challenges, particularly in the area of
crash consistency and fault tolerance. Systems that use NVMM must preserve crash-consistency
in the presence of volatile caches, out-of-order execution, software bugs, and system failures.
To address these challenges, many groups have proposed crash-consistency solutions based
on hardware [74, 85, 73, 77], file systems [13, 22, 104, 105], user-space data structures and
libraries [107, 93, 12, 103, 82, 36, 14], and languages [79, 18].
Fault tolerance has received less attention but is equally important: To be viable as an
enterprise-ready storage medium, persistent data structures must include protection from data
corruption. Intel processors report uncorrectable memory media errors via a machine-check
exception and the kernel forwards it to user-space as a SIGBUS signal. To our knowledge, Xu et
al. [105] were the first to design an NVMM file system that detects and attempts to recover from
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these errors. Among programming libraries, only libpmemobj provides any support for fault
tolerance, but it incurs 100% space overhead, only protects against media errors (not software
“scribbles”), and cannot recover corrupted data without taking the object store offline.
Xu et al. also highlighted a fundamental conflict between DAX-mmap() and file system-
based fault tolerance: By design, DAX-mmap() leaves the file system unaware of updates made to
the file, making it impossible for the file system to update the redundancy data for the file. Their
solution is to disable file data protection while the file is mapped and restore it afterward. This
provides well-defined protection guarantees but leaves file data unprotected when it is in use.
Moving fault-tolerance to user-space NVMM libraries solves this problem, but presents
challenges since it requires integrating fault tolerance into persistent object libraries that manage
potentially millions of small, heterogeneous objects.
To satisfy the competing requirements placed on NVMM-based, DAX-mapped object
store, a fault-tolerant persistent object library should provide at least the following characteristics:
1. Crash-consistency. The library should provide the means to ensure consistency in the face
of both system failures and data corruption.
2. Protection against media and software errors. Both types of errors are real threats to
data stored to NVMM, so the library should provide protection against both.
3. Low storage overhead. NVMM is expensive, so minimizing storage overhead of fault
tolerance is important.
4. Online recovery. For good availability, detection and recovery must proceed without
taking the persistent object store offline.
5. High performance. Speed is a key benefit of NVMM. If fault-tolerance incurs a large
performance penalty, NVMM will be much less attractive.
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6. Support for diverse objects. A persistent object system must support objects of size
ranging from a few cache lines to many megabytes.
This chapter describes Pangolin, the first persistent object library to satisfy all these
criteria. Pangolin uses a combination of parity, replication, and object-level checksums to provide
space-efficient, high-performance fault tolerance for complex NVMM data structures. Pangolin
also introduces a new technique for accessing NVMM called micro-buffering that simplifies
transactions and protects NVMM data structures from programming errors.
We evaluate Pangolin using a suite of benchmarks and compare it to libpmemobj, a
persistent object library that offers a simple replication mode for fault tolerance. Compared to
libpmemobj, performance is similar, and Pangolin provides stronger protection, online recovery,
and greatly reduced storage overhead (1% instead of 100%).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 provides a primer on NVMM
programming and NVMM error handling in Linux. Section 3.2 describes how Pangolin organizes
data, manages transactions, and detects and repairs errors. Section 3.3 presents our evaluations.
Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 discusses other design options and related works, respectively. Finally,
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.1 Background
Pangolin lets programmers build fault-tolerant, crash-consistent data structures in NVMM.
This section first introduces NVMM and the DAX mechanism applications use to gain direct
access to persistent data. Then, we describe the NVMM error handling mechanisms that Intel
processors and Linux provide. Finally, we provide a brief primer on NVMM programming using
libpmemobj [82], the library on which Pangolin is based.
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3.1.1 Non-volatile Main Memory and DAX
Several technologies are poised to make NVMM common in computer systems. 3D
XPoint [69] is the closest to wide deployment. Phase change memory (PCM), resistive RAM
(ReRAM), and spin-torque transfer RAM (STT-RAM) are also under active development by
memory manufacturers. Flash-backed DRAM is already available and in wide use. Linux and
Windows both have support for accessing NVMM and using it as storage media.
The performance and cost parameters of NVMM lie between DRAM and SSD. Its write
latency is longer than DRAM, but it will cost less per bit. From the storage perspective, NVMM
is faster but more expensive than SSD.
The most efficient way to access NVMM is via direct access (DAX) [42] memory mapping
(i.e., DAX-mmap()). To use DAX-mmap(), applications map pages of a file in an NVMM-aware
file system into their address space, so the application can access persistent data from the user-
space using load and store instructions, without the file system intervening.
3.1.2 Handling NVMM Media Errors
To recover from data corruption, Pangolin relies on error detection and media management
facilities that the processor and operating system provide together. Below, we describe these
facilities available on Intel and Linux platforms. Windows provides similar mechanisms.
Hardware Error Correction. Memory controllers for commercially available NVMMs
(i.e., battery-backed DRAM and 3D XPoint) implement error-correction code (ECC) in hardware
to detect and correct media errors when they can, and they report uncorrectable (but detectable)
errors with a machine check exception (MCE) [41] that the operating system can catch and
attempt to handle.
Pangolin provides a layer of protection in addition to the ECC hardware provides, but it
does not require hardware ECC. Pangolin uses checksums to detect errors that hardware cannot
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detect. This mechanism also catches software bugs (which are invisible to hardware ECC). ECC
does, however, improve performance by transparently handling many media errors.
Regardless of the ECC algorithm hardware provides, field studies of DRAM and SSDs [92,
37, 97, 90, 68, 75] have shown that detectable but uncorrectable media errors occur frequently
enough to warrant additional software protection. Furthermore, file systems [109, 105, 54] apply
checksums to their data structures to protect against scribbles.
Repairing Errors. When the hardware detects an uncorrectable error, the Linux kernel
marks the region surrounding the failed load as “poisoned,” and future loads from the region
will fail with a bus error. Pangolin assumes an error poisons a 4 KB page since Linux currently
manages memory failures at page granularity.
If a running application causes an MCE (by loading from a poisoned page), the kernel
sends it a SIGBUS and the application can extract the affected address from the data structure
describing the signal.
The software can repair the poisoned page by writing new data to the region. In response,
the operating system and NVDIMM firmware work together to remap the poisoned addresses to
functioning memory cells. The details of this process are part of the Advanced Configuration and
Power Interface (ACPI) [101] for NVDIMMs.
Recent kernel patches [15, 16, 17, 62] and NVMM library [82] provide utilities for user-
space applications to restore lost data by re-writing affected pages with recovered contents (if
available).
3.1.3 NVMM Programming
In this section, we describe libpmemobj’s programming model. Libpmemobj is a well-
supported, open-source C library for programming with DAX-mapped NVMM. It provides
facilities for memory management and software transactions that let applications build a persistent
object store. Pangolin’s interface and implementation are based on libpmemobj from PMDK.
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Figure 3.1: DAX-mapped NVMM as an object store - Libpmemobj divides the mapped space
into zones and chunks for memory management.
Linux exposes NVMM to the user-space as memory-mapped files (Figure 3.1). Libpmemobj
(and Pangolin) refer to the mapped file as a pool of persistent objects. Each pool spans a continu-
ous range of virtual addresses.
1 PMEMobjpool *pool = pmemobj_open("/dax/pool");
2 ...
3 struct node *n = pmemobj_direct(node_oid);
4 n->val = value;
5 pmemobj_persist(pool , &n->val, 8);
6 ...
7 TX_BEGIN(pool) {
8 n = pmemobj_direct(node_oid);
9 pmemobj_tx_add_range(node_oid , 0, sizeof(*n));
10 n->next = pmemobj_tx_alloc (...);
11 } TX_ONABORT {
12 /* handling transaction aborts */
13 } TX_END
14 ...
15 pmemobj_close(pool);
Listing 3.1: A libpmemobj program - First modify a node value in a linked list, and later
allocate and link a new node from the pool.
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Within a pool, libpmemobj reserves a metadata region that contains information such
as the pool’s identification (64-bit UUID) and the offset to a “root object” from which all other
live objects are reachable. Next, is an area reserved for transaction logs. Libpmemobj uses redo
logging for its metadata updates and undo logging for application object updates. Transaction logs
reside in one of two locations depending on their sizes. Small log entries live in the provisioned
“Log” region, as shown in Figure 3.1. Large ones overflow into the “Heap” storage area.
The rest of the pool is the persistent heap. Libpmemobj’s NVMM allocator (a persistent
variant of malloc/free) manages it. The allocator divides the heap’s space into several “zones”
as shown in Figure 3.1. A zone contains metadata and a sequence of “chunks.” The allocator
divides up a chunk for small objects and coalesces adjacent chunks for large objects. By default,
a zone is 16 GB, and a chunk is 256 KB.
Listing 3.1 presents an example to highlight the key concepts of NVMM programming.
The code performs two independent operations on a persistent linked list: one is to modify a
node’s value, and another is to allocate and link a new node.
This example demonstrates two styles of crash-consistent NVMM programming: atomic-
style (lines 3-5) for a simple modification that is 8 bytes or smaller, and transactional-style (lines
7-13) for arbitrary-sized NVMM updates.
Building data structures in NVMM using libpmemobj (or any other persistent object
library) differs from conventional DRAM programming in several ways:
Memory Allocation. Libpmemobj provides crash-consistent NVMM allocation and
deallocation functions: pmemobj tx alloc/pmemobj tx free. They let the programmer specify
object type and size to allocate and prevent orphaned regions in the case of poorly-time crashes.
Addressing Scheme. Persistent pointers within a pool must remain valid regardless of
at what virtual address the pool resides. Libpmemobj uses a PMEMoid data structure to address an
object within a pool. It consists of a 64-bit file ID and a 64-bit byte offset relative to the start of
the file. The pmemobj direct() function translates a PMEMoid into a native pointer for use in
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load or store instructions.
Failure-atomic Updates. Modern x86 CPUs only guarantee that 8-byte, aligned
stores atomically update NVMM [44]. If applications need larger atomic updates, they must
manually construct software transactions. Libpmemobj provides undo log-based transactions. The
application executes stores to NVMM between the TX BEGIN and TX END macros, and snapshots
(pmemobj tx add range) a range of object data before modifying it in-place.
Persistence Ordering. Intel CPUs provide cache flush/write-back (e.g., CLFLUSH(OPT)
and CLWB) and memory ordering (e.g., SFENCE) instructions to make guarantees about when stores
become persistent. In Listing 3.1, the pmemobj persist function and TX macros integrate these
instructions to flush modified object ranges.
Libpmemobj supports a replicated mode that requires a replica pool, doubling the storage
the object store requires. Libpmemobj applies updates to both pools to keep them synchronized.
Replicated libpmemobj can detect and recover from media errors only when the object
store is offline, and it cannot detect or recover from data corruption caused by errant stores to
NVMM – so-called “scribbles,” that might result from a buffer overrun or dereferencing a wild
pointer.
3.2 Pangolin Design
Pangolin allows programmers to build complex, crash-consistent persistent data structures
that are also robust in the face of media errors and software “scribbles” that corrupt data. Pangolin
satisfies all of the criteria listed in the introduction of this chapter. This section describes its
architecture and highlights the key challenges that Pangolin addresses to meet those requirements.
In particular, Pangolin provides the following features unseen in prior works.
• It provides fast, space-efficient recovery from media errors and scribbles.
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Figure 3.2: Data protection scheme in Pangolin - Pangolin protects pool metadata (PM), zone
metadata (ZM), and chunk metadata (CM).
• It uses checksums to protect object integrity and supports incremental checksum updates.
• It integrates parity and checksum updates into an NVMM transaction system.
• It periodically scrubs data to identify corruption.
• It detects and recovers from media errors and scribbles online.
Pangolin guarantees that it can recover from the loss of any single 4 KB page of data in a
pool. In many cases, it can recover from the concurrent loss of multiple pages.
We begin by describing how Pangolin organizes data to protect user objects, library
metadata, and transaction logs using a combination of parity, replication, and checksums. Next,
we describe micro-buffers and explain how they allow Pangolin to preserve a simple programming
interface and protect against software scribbles. Then, we explain how Pangolin detects and
prevents NVMM corruption and elaborate on Pangolin’s transaction implementation with support
for efficient, concurrent updates of object parity. Finally, we discuss how Pangolin restores data
integrity after corruption and crashes.
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3.2.1 Pangolin’s Data Organization
Pangolin uses replication for its internal metadata and RAID-style parity for user objects
to provide redundancy for corruption recovery. The MCE mechanism described in Section 3.1.2
and object checksums in Pangolin detect corruption.
Pangolin views a zone’s chunks as a two-dimensional array as shown in the middle of
Figure 3.2. Each chunk row contains multiple, contiguous chunks and the chunks “wrap around”
so that the last chunk of a row and the first chunk of the next are adjacent. Pangolin reserves the
last chunk row for parity.
In our description of Pangolin, we define a page column as a one page-wide, aligned
column that cuts across the rows of a zone. A range column is similar, but can be arbitrarily wide
(no more than a chunk row’s size).
Initializing a parity-coded NVMM pool requires zeroing out all the bytes in the file. This
is a one-time overhead when creating a pool file and does not affect run-time performance. We
report this latency in Section 3.3.
To detect corruption in user objects, Pangolin adds a 32-bit checksum to the object’s
header. The header also contains the object’s size (64-bit) and type (32-bit). The compiler
determines type values according to user-defined object types. Pangolin inherits this design from
libpmemobj and changes the type identifier from 64-bit to 32-bit for the checksum.
Pangolin’s object placement is independent of chunk and row boundaries. Objects can be
anywhere within a zone, and they can be of any size (up to the zone size).
In addition to user objects, the library maintains metadata for the pool, zones, and chunks,
including allocation bitmaps. Pangolin checksums these data structures to detect corruption and
replicates the pool’s and zones’ metadata for fault tolerance. These structures are small (less than
0.1% for pools larger than 1 GB), so replicating them is not expensive. Pangolin uses zone parity
to support recovery of chunk metadata.
Pangolin checksums transaction logs and replicates them for redundancy. It treats log
42
Table 3.1: The Pangolin API - Pangolin’s interface mirrors libpmemobj’s except that Pangolin
does not allow direct writing to NVMM.
Function Semantics
pgl tx begin()/commit()/end(), etc. Control the lifetime of a Pangolin transaction.
pgl tx alloc()/free() Allocate or deallocate an NVMM object.
pgl tx open(PMEMoid oid, ...) Create a thread-local micro-buffer for an NVMM object. Verify (and restore)
the object integrity, and return a pointer to the micro-buffered user object.
pgl tx add range(PMEMoid oid, ...) Invoke pgl tx open and then mark a range of the object that will be modified.
pgl get(PMEMoid oid) Get access to an object, either directly in NVMM or in its micro-buffer,
depending on the transaction context. By default, it does not verify the checksum.
pgl open(PMEMoid oid, ...) Create a micro-buffer for an NVMM object without a transaction. Check the
object integrity, and return a pointer to the micro-buffered user object.
pgl commit(void *uobj) Automatically start a transaction and commit the modified user object in a
micro-buffer to NVMM.
entries in zone storage as zeros during parity calculations. This prevents parity update contention
between log entries and user objects (see Section 3.2.5).
Fault Tolerance Guarantees. Pangolin can tolerate a single 4 KB media error any-
where in the pool, regardless of whether it is a data page or a parity page. Based on the bad page’s
address Pangolin can locate its page column and restore its data using other healthy pages.
Faults affecting two pages of the same page column may cause data loss if the corrupted
ranges overlap. If an application demands more robust fault tolerance, it can increase the chunk
row size, reducing the number of rows and, consequently, the likelihood that two corrupt pages
overlap.
Pangolin can recover from scribbles (contiguous overwrites caused by software errors)
on NVMM data up to a chunk-row size. By default, Pangolin uses 100 chunk rows, and parity
consumes ∼1% of a pool’s size (e.g., 1 GB for a 100 GB pool).
3.2.2 Micro-buffering for NVMM Objects
Pangolin introduces micro-buffering to hide the complexity of updating checksums and
parity when modifying NVMM objects. Adding checksums to objects and protecting them
with parity makes updates more complex, since all three – object data, checksum, and parity –
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must change at once to preserve consistency. This challenge is especially acute for the atomic
programming model as shown in Listing 3.1 (line 3-5) because a single 8-byte NVMM write
cannot host all these updates.
Micro-buffering creates a shadow copy of an NVMM object in DRAM, which separates
an object’s transient and persistent versions (Figure 3.2). In Listing 3.2, pgl open creates a
micro-buffer for the node object by allocating a DRAM buffer and copying the node’s data from
NVMM. It also verifies the object’s checksum and performs corruption recovery if necessary.
The application can modify the micro-buffered object without concern for its checksum,
parity, and crash-consistency because changes exist only in the micro-buffer. When the updates
finish, pgl commit starts a transaction that atomically updates the NVMM object, its checksum,
and parity (described below). Compared to line 3-5 of Listing 3.1, Pangolin retains the simple,
atomic-style programming model for modifying a single NVMM object, and it supports updates
within an object beyond 8 bytes.
Each micro-buffer’s header contains information such as its NVMM address, modified
ranges, and status flags (e.g., allocated or modified). We elaborate on Pangolin’s programming
interface and how to construct complex transactions with micro-buffering in Section 3.2.4.
1 struct node *n = pgl_open(node_oid);
2 n->val = value;
3 pgl_commit(pool , n);
Listing 3.2: A Pangolin transaction for a single-object.
Another important consideration for micro-buffering is to prevent misbehaving software
from corrupting NVMM. If an application’s code can directly write to NVMM, as libpmemobj
allows to, software bugs such as buffer overflows and using dangling pointers can easily cause
NVMM corruption. Conventional debugging tools for memory safety, such as Valgrind [76] and
AddressSanitizer [94], insert inaccessible bytes between objects as “redzones” to trap illegal
accesses. This approach fails to work for directly accessed NVMM objects because once they
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are allocated, there is no guarantee for spacing between them, and thus, redzones may land on a
nearby, accessible object. One viable approach to using these tools is to let the NVMM allocator
insert redzones. However, the presence of redzone bytes will pollute the pool and may exacerbate
fragmentation.
Using micro-buffers isolates transient writes from persistent data, and since micro-buffers
are dynamically allocated using malloc(), they are compatible with existing memory debugging
tools. Without using debugging tools, Pangolin also protects micro-buffers by inserting a 64-bit
“canary” word in each micro-buffer’s header and checks its integrity before writing back to
NVMM. On transaction commit, if Pangolin detects a canary mismatch, it aborts the transaction
to avoid propagating the corruption to NVMM. Pangolin uses checksums to detect corruptions
that may bypass the canary protection.
3.2.3 Detecting NVMM Corruption
Pangolin uses three mechanisms to detect NVMM corruption. First, it installs a handler
for SIGBUS (see Section 3.1.2) that fires when the Linux kernel receives an MCE. A signal handler
has access to the address the offending load accessed, and Pangolin can determine what kind
of data (i.e., metadata or a user object) lives there and recover appropriately. This mechanism
detects media failures, but it cannot discover corrupted data caused by software “scribbles.”
To detect scribbles, Pangolin verifies the integrity of user objects using their checksums.
Verifying checksums on every access can be expensive. To limit this cost, by default Pangolin only
verifies checksums during micro-buffer creation before any object is modified in a transaction.
This keeps Pangolin from recalculating a new checksum based on corrupt data. For read-only
objects that are accessed by pgl get without micro-buffering, by default Pangolin does not verify
checksums. To protect them, Pangolin provides two alternative operation modes: “Scrub” mode
runs a scrubbing thread that verifies and restores the whole pool’s data integrity when a preset
number of transactions have completed, and “Conservative” mode verifies the checksum for every
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object access (including pgl get). We evaluate the impact of different checksum verification
policies in Section 3.3.
Finally, Linux keeps track of known bad pages of NVMM across reboots. When opening
a pool or during its scrubbing, Pangolin can extract this information and recover the data in the
reported pages (not currently implemented).
3.2.4 Fault-Tolerant Transactions
Failure-atomic transactions are central to Pangolin’s interface, and they must include
verification of data integrity and updates to the checksums and parity data that protect objects.
Table 3.1 summarizes Pangolin’s core functions.
Pangolin supports arbitrary-sized transactions and we have made similar APIs and macros
as libpmemobj’s. The program in Listing 3.1 can be easily transformed to Pangolin using
equivalent functions. One subtle difference is in the handling of atomic-style updates, as shown
in Listing 3.2.
In Pangolin, each thread can execute one transaction or nested transactions (same as
libpmemobj). Concurrent transactions can execute if each one is associated with a different
thread. Currently, Pangolin does not allow concurrent transactions to modify the same NVMM
object. Concurrently modifying a shared object may cause data inconsistency if one transaction
has to abort. Libpmemobj has the same limitation [45].
Each transaction manages its own micro-buffers using a thread-local hashmap [58],
indexed by an NVMM object’s PMEMoid. Therefore, in a transaction, calling pgl tx open for
the same object either creates or retrieves its micro-buffer. Multiple micro-buffers opened in one
transaction form a linked list as shown in Figure 3.2. Micro-buffers for one transaction are not
visible in other transactions, providing isolation.
If a transaction modifies an object, Pangolin copies it to a micro-buffer, performs the
changes there, and then propagates the changes to NVMM during commit. Since changes occur
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in DRAM (which does not require undo information), Pangolin implements redo logging.
At transaction commit, Pangolin recomputes the checksums for modified micro-buffers,
creates and replicates redo log entries for the modified parts of the micro-buffers and writes
these ranges back to NVMM objects. Then, it updates the affected parity bits (see Section 3.2.5)
and marks the transaction committed. Finally, Pangolin garbage-collects its logs and closes
thread-local micro-buffers.
If a transaction aborts, either due to unrecoverable data corruption or other run-time errors,
Pangolin discards the transaction’s micro-buffers without touching NVMM.
A transaction can also allocate and deallocate objects. Pangolin uses redo logging to
record NVMM allocation and free operations, just as libpmemobj does.
For read-only workloads, repeatedly creating micro-buffers and verifying object check-
sums can be very expensive. Therefore, Pangolin provides pgl get to gain direct access to an
NVMM object without verifying the object’s checksum. The application can verify an object’s
integrity manually as needed or rely on Pangolin’s periodic scrubbing mechanism. Inside a
transaction context, pgl get returns a pointer to the object’s micro-buffer to preserve isolation.
3.2.5 Parity and Checksum Updates
Objects in different rows can share the same range of parity, and we say these objects
overlap. Object overlap leads to a challenge for updating the shared parity because updates
from different transactions must serialize but naively locking the whole parity region sacrifices
scalability.
For instance, using ObjA and ObjC in Figure 3.2, suppose two different transactions
modify them, replacing A with A′ and C with C′, respectively. After both transactions update
P, the parity should have the value P′ = A′⊕C′⊕D⊕E regardless of how the two transaction
commits interleave.
Pangolin uses a combination of two techniques that exploit the commutativity of XOR
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and fine-grained locking to preserve correctness and scalability.
Atomic parity updates. The first approach uses the atomic XOR instruction (analo-
gous to an atomic increment) that modern CPUs provide to perform incremental parity updates
for changes to each overlapping object.
In our example, we can compute two parity patches: ∆A = A⊕A′, ∆C = C⊕C′ and then
rewrite P′ as P⊕∆A⊕∆C. Since XOR commutes and is a bit-wise operation, the two threads can
perform their updates without synchronization.
Hybrid parity updates. Atomic XOR is slower than normal or vectorized XOR. For
small updates, the latency difference between them is not significant, and Pangolin prefers atomic
XOR instructions to update parity without the need for locks. But for large parity updates, atomic
XOR can be inefficient. Therefore, Pangolin’s hybrid parity scheme switches to vectorized XOR
for large transfers.
To coordinate large and small parity updates, Pangolin uses parity range-locks, that work
similarly as reader/writer locks (or shared mutex): Small writes take shared ownership of a range
lock and update parity with atomic XOR instructions. Large updates using vectorized XORs take
exclusive ownership of a range-lock, and only one thread can modify parity in a locked range. If
one update involves multiple range-locks, serialization happens on a per-range-lock basis.
The managed size of a parity range-lock depends on the performance trade-off between
Pangolin’s parity mode and libpmemobj’s replication mode. We discuss this in Section 3.3.
Pangolin refreshes an object’s checksum in its micro-buffer before updating parity, and it
considers the checksum field as one of the modified ranges of the object. Checksums like CRC32
requires recomputing the checksum using the whole object. This can become costly with large
objects. Thus, Pangolin uses Adler32 [54], a checksum that allows incremental updates, to make
the cost of updating an object’s checksum proportional to the size of the modified range rather
than the object size.
We implement Pangolin’s parity and checksum updates using the Intelligent Storage
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Acceleration Library (ISA-L) [46], which leverages SIMD instructions of modern CPUs for these
data-intensive tasks.
Protections for other transaction systems. Other NVMM persistent object systems
could apply Pangolin’s techniques for parity and checksum updates. For example, consider an
undo logging (as opposed to Pangolin’s redo logging) system that first stores a “snapshot” copy of
an object in the log before modifying the original in-place. In this case, the system could compute
a parity patch using the XOR result between the logged data (old) and the object’s data (new).
Then, it can apply the parity patch using the hybrid method we described in this section.
3.2.6 Recovering from Faults
In this section, we discuss how Pangolin recovers data integrity from both NVMM
corruption and system crashes.
Corruption recovery. Pangolin uses the same algorithm to recover from errors regard-
less of how it detects them (i.e., via SIGBUS or a checksum mismatch).
The first step is to pause the current thread’s transaction, and to wait until all other
outstanding transactions have completed. Meanwhile, Pangolin prevents the initialization of new
transactions by setting the pool’s “freeze” flag. This is necessary because, during transaction
committing, parity data may be inconsistent.
Once the pool is frozen, Pangolin uses the parity bits and the corresponding parts of each
row in the page column to recover the missing data.
Pangolin preserves crash-consistency during repair by making persistent records of the
bad pages under recovery. Recovery is idempotent, so it can simply re-execute after a crash.
Pangolin’s current implementation only allows one thread to perform any online corruption
recovery, and if the thread is executing a transaction, online recovery only works if the thread
has not started committing. If two threads encounter faults simultaneously, Pangolin kills the
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application and performs post-crash recovery (see below) when it restarts. Supporting multi-
threaded online recovery, and allowing it to work when threads have partially written NVMM
is possible, but it requires complex reasoning about how to restore the data and its parity to a
consistent state.
Crash recovery. Pangolin handles recovery from a crash using its redo logs. It must
also protect against the possibility that the crash occurred during a parity update.
To commit a transaction, Pangolin first ensures its redo logs are persistent and replicated,
and then updates the NVMM objects and their parity. If a crash happens before redo logs are
complete, Pangolin discards the redo logs on reboot without touching the objects or parity. If
redo logs exist, Pangolin replays them to update the objects and then recomputes any affected
parity ranges using the data written during replay (which is now known to be correct) and the
data from the other rows.
Pangolin does not log parity updates because it would double the cost of logging. This
does raise the possibility of data loss if a crash occurs during a parity update and a media error
then corrupts data of the same page column before recovery can complete. This scenario requires
the simultaneous loss of two pages in the same page column due to corruption and a crash, which
we expect to be rare.
3.3 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate Pangolin’s performance and the overheads it incurs by compar-
ing it to normal libpmemobj and its replicated version. We start with our experimental setup and
then consider its storage requirements, latency impact, scalability, application-level performance,
and corruption recovery.
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Figure 3.3: Transaction performance - Each transaction allocates, overwrites, or frees one object
of varying sizes. Pangolin’s latencies are similar to Pmemobj’s.
3.3.1 Evaluation Setup
We perform our evaluation on a dual-socket platform with Intel’s Optane DC Persistent
Memory [47]. The CPUs are 24-core engineering samples of the Cascade Lake generation. Each
socket has 192 GB DDR4 DRAM and 1.5 TB NVMM. We configure the persistent memory
modules in AppDirect mode and run experiments on one socket using its local DRAM and
NVMM. A recent report [49] studying this platform provides more architectural details.
The CPU provides the CLWB instruction for writing-back cache lines to NVMM, non-
temporal store instructions to bypass caches, and the SFENCE instruction to ensure persistence and
memory ordering. It also has atomic XOR and AVX instructions that our parity and checksum
computations use.
The evaluation machine runs Fedora 27 with a Linux kernel version 4.13 built from source
with the NOVA [104] file system. We run experiments with both Ext4-DAX [63] and NOVA, and
applications use mmap() to access NVMM-resident files. The performance is similar on the two
file systems because DAX-mmap() essentially bypasses them.
On our evaluation machine, we found that updating parity with atomic XORs becomes
worse than libpmemobj’s replication mode when the modified parity range is greater than 8 KB,
so we set 8 KB as the threshold to switch between those parity calculation strategies (see
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Table 3.2: Library configurations for evaluation - In the figures, we abbreviate Pangolin as pgl.
Pmemobj libpmemobj baseline from PMDK v1.5
Pangolin Pangolin baseline w/ micro-buffering only
Pangolin-ML Pangolin + metadata and redo log replication
Pangolin-MLP Pangolin-ML + object parity
Pangolin-MLPC Pangolin-MLP + object checksums
Pmemobj-R libpmemobj w/ one replication in another file
Section 3.2.5).
Table 3.2 describes the operation modes for our evaluations. The Pangolin baseline
implements transactions with micro-buffering. It uses buffer canaries to prevent corruption from
affecting NVMM, but it does not have parity or checksum for NVMM data.
We evaluate versions of Pangolin that incrementally add metadata and log replication
(“+ML”), object parity (“+MLP”), and checksums (“+MLPC”). We combine the impact of
metadata updates with log replication because metadata updates are small and cheap in our
evaluation.
Pmemobj-R is the replication mode of libpmemobj that mirrors updates to a replica
pool during transaction commit. Comparing Pangolin-MLP and Pmemobj-R is especially useful
because the two configurations protect against the same types of data corruption: media errors
but not scribbles.
3.3.2 Memory Requirements
We discuss and evaluate Pangolin’s memory requirements for both NVMM and DRAM.
NVMM All our Pangolin experiments use a single pool of 100 GB that contains 6×
16 GB zones. Pangolin replicates all the pool’s metadata in the same file, which occupies a fixed
∼20 MB. The rest of the space is for user objects and their protection data. By default, Pangolin
uses 100 chunk rows, so each zone has about 160 MB parity, and that totally occupies ∼1% of
the pool’s capacity. Pmemobj-R uses a second 100 GB file as the replica, doubling the cost of
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Figure 3.4: Scalability - Concurrent workloads randomly overwrite objects of varying sizes.
NVMM space requirement.
When using parity, Pangolin has to zero out the whole pool to ensure all zones are initially
parity-coded. This takes about 130 seconds. It is a one-time overhead for creating the pool and
excluded from the following evaluations.
DRAM Pangolin uses malloc()’d DRAM to construct micro-buffers. The required
DRAM space is proportional to ongoing transaction sizes. Table 3.3 summarized the transaction
sizes for the evaluated key-value store data structures. Pangolin automatically recycles them on
transaction commits. In our evaluation experiments, micro-buffering never exceeds using 50 MB
of DRAM.
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3.3.3 Transaction Performance
Figure 3.3 illustrates the transaction latencies for three basic operations on an NVMM
object store: object allocation, overwrite, and deallocation. Each transaction operates on one
object, and we vary the size of the object.
For allocation, latency grows with object size for all five configurations, due to constructing
the object and cache line write-back latency. Pangolin incurs 2% - 13% lower latencies than
Pmemobj due to its use of non-temporal stores for write backs. An allocation operation does not
involve object logging, so Pangolin-ML shows performance similar to Pangolin. Pangolin-MLP
adds overhead to update the parity data. It outperforms Pmemobj-R by between 1.2× and 1.9×.
We found this is because updating parity using atomic XORs and CLWBs incurs less latency than
mirroring data in a separate file, as Pmemobj-R does.
Adding checksum (Pangolin-MLPC) incurs less than 7% overhead compared to Pangolin-
MLP. Parity’s impact is larger than checksum’s because updating a parity range demands values
from three parts: the micro-buffer, the NVMM object, and the old parity data, while computing a
checksum only needs data in a DRAM-based micro-buffer. Moreover, Pangolin needs to flush the
modified parity range to persistence, which is the same size as the object. In contrary, updating a
checksum only writes back a single cache line that contains the checksum value.
Overwriting an NVMM object involves transaction logging for crash consistency. Pangolin
and Pmemobj store the same amount of logging data in NVMM, although they use redo logging
and undo logging for this purpose, respectively. Since log entry size is proportional to an object’s
modified size, which is the whole object in this evaluation, this cost grows with the object. With
Pangolin, log replication accounts for between 7% to 25% of the latency. Parity updates consume
between 8% to 27% of the extra latency, depending on object size, and checksum updates account
for less than 5%. Pangolin-MLP’s performance for overwrites is 12% worse than Pmemobj-R for
64 B object updates and is between 1.1× and 1.5× better than Pmemobj-R for objects larger than
64 B.
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Table 3.3: Data structure and transaction sizes - “Insert” and “Remove” show average transaction
sizes for insertions and removals, respectively. “New” and “Mod” indicate average allocated
and modified sizes.
ctree rbtree btree skiplist rtree hashmap
Object size 56 80 304 408 4136 10 M (table), 40 (entry)
Insert
New 56 (1.00) 80 (1.00) 65.9 (0.22) 408 (1.00) 4502 (1.09) 60.9 (1.00)
Mod 127.6 (3.28) 330.2 (5.13) 381.2 (1.47) 33.9 (2.50) 200.0 (5.05) 331.1 (4.21)
Remove
New 0 0 0 0 184.1 (0.05) 10.5 (1×10–5)
Mod 28.0 (0.50) 202.8 (2.65) 268.3 (0.90) 16.9 (0.75) 98.6 (2.52) 254.3 (2.16)
Deallocation transactions only modify metadata, so their latencies do not change much.
3.3.4 Scalability
Figure 4.8 measures Pangolin’s scalability by randomly overwriting existing NVMM
objects and varying the object sizes and the number of concurrent threads.
Pangolin uses reader/writer locks to implement the hybrid parity update scheme described
in Section 3.2.5. The number of rows in a zone and the zone size determine the granularity of
these locks: For a fixed zone size, more rows means fewer columns and fewer parity range-locks.
There is no lock contention in the results because the transactions use atomic XOR
instructions and can execute concurrently (only taking the reader locks). Our configuration with
1% parity (160 MB parity per 16 GB zone) has 20 K range-locks per zone, so the chance of lock
contention is slim even with large updates (more than 8 KB) and many cores.
The graphs also show how each Pangolin’s fault-tolerance mechanisms affect performance.
Pangolin’s throughput is very close to Pmemobj. Pangolin-MLP mostly outperforms Pmemobj-
R for object updates that are 256 B or larger, up to 1.5×. But for 64 B object updates, it
performs worse than Pmemobj-R by between 6% and 25%. This is because when enabling
parity, every Pangolin transaction checks the pool freeze flag (an atomic variable), incurring
synchronization overhead. This overhead is noticeable for short transactions with 64 B objects
but becomes negligible for larger updates. Pangolin-MLPC only performs marginally worse than
Pangolin-MLP.
55
ctree rbtree btree skiplist rtree hashmap
0
100
200
300
KO
ps
/s
1M Inserts
pmemobj pgl pgl-ml pgl-mlp pgl-mlpc pmemobj-r
ctree rbtree btree skiplist rtree hashmap
1M Removes
Figure 3.5: Key-value store performance - Each transaction either inserts or removes one
key-value pair from the data store.
Scaling degrades for all configuration as update size and thread count grow because the
sustainable bandwidth of the persistent memory modules becomes saturated.
3.3.5 Impacts on NVMM Applications
To evaluate Pangolin in more complex applications, we use six data structures included in
the PMDK toolkit: crit-bit tree (ctree), red-black tree (rbtree), btree, skiplist, radix tree (rtree),
and hashmap. They have a wide range of object sizes and use a diverse set of algorithms to insert,
remove, and lookup values. We rewrite these benchmarks with Pangolin’s programming interface
as described in Section 3.2.4.
Table 3.3 summarizes the object and transaction sizes for each workload. The tree
structures and the skiplist have a single type of object, which is the tree or list node. Hashmap
has two kinds of objects. One is the hash table that contains pointers to buckets. The hash table
grows as the application inserts more key-value pairs. Each bucket is a linked list of fixed-sized
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Figure 3.6: Checksum verification impact - Pangolin-MLPC bars are the same as those in
Figure 3.5 for 1M Inserts. The cost of different policies depends strongly on data structures.
entry objects.
Each insertion or removal is a transaction processing a key-value pair. The workloads
involve a mix of object allocations, overwrites, and deallocations. Table 3.3 shows, on average,
the number of bytes and objects (in parentheses) involved in each data structure’s transaction.
Deallocated sizes are not shown because they marginally affect the performance differences (see
Figure 3.3).
An average allocation size (“New” rows in the table) smaller than the object size means
the data structure does not allocate a new object for every insert operation (e.g., btree). The
average modified sizes (“Mod” rows) determine the logging size and affect the performance drop
between Pangolin and Pangolin-ML. Note that a transaction does not necessarily modify (and
log) the whole range of an involved object. The performance difference between Pangolin-ML
and Pangolin-MLP is a consequence of both allocated and modified sizes.
For insert transactions, Pangolin is faster than Pmemobj for ctree and btree, but slower
than Pmemobj for other data structures. This is because the slower applications have relatively
small modified sizes compared to the object sizes, and Pangolin’s data movement from NVMM
to micro-buffers overshadows its advantage for whole-object updates, as shown in Figure 3.3. For
remove transactions, Pangolin is marginally faster than Pmemobj except for the case of skiplist,
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Table 3.4: Vulnerability evaluation - Each row shows object bytes (normalized to Pmemobj)
accessed without checksum verification.
ctree rbtree btree sklist rtree hmap
Pmemobj 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Pgl-MLPC 0.92 0.84 0.87 0.96 0.42 0.42
Scrub 100K 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.05
Scrub 50K 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02
Conservative 0 0 0 0 0 0
which is also because of the data movement caused by micro-buffering.
Pangolin-MLP’s performance is 95% of Pmemobj-R on average, and it saves orders of
magnitude NVMM space by using parity data as redundancy. Pangolin-MLPC adds scribble
detection and performance drops by between 1.5% to 15% relative to Pangolin-MLP. Adding
object checksums impacts rtree’s transactions the most because the allocated object size is large,
which requires more checksum computing time.
Pangolin does not impact the lookup performance because it performs direct NVMM
reads without constantly verifying object checksums. Pangolin ensures data integrity with its
checksum verification policy, as discussed in Section 3.2.3.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the impact of different strategies for checksum verification. We
compare Pangolin’s default mode (Pangolin-MLPC) with two “Scrub” modes and a “Conservative”
mode. The default mode only verifies checksums for micro-buffered objects. In “Scrub” mode, a
scrubbing thread verifies data integrity of the whole object pool when a preset number (indicated
by legends in Figure 3.6) of transactions have completed. The “Conservative” mode verifies the
checksum for every object access (including those read by pgl get without micro-buffering).
Table 3.4 quantifies the vulnerability using the amount of object data that is accessed
without checksum verification. The data accumulates across all transactions for Pmemobj,
Pangolin-MLPC, and “Conservative” modes. For “Scrub” modes, we count the vulnerable data
between two scrubbing runs. Numbers in Table 3.4 are normalized to Pmemobj, which does not
have any checksum protection for object data.
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The cost of verifying checksums for every object access depends strongly on the data
structure size and its insertion algorithm. For small objects, such as ctree, rbtree, and hashmap,
the cost is negligible. But for btree, skiplist, and rtree, due to their large object sizes, the cost is
significant. Thus, a scrubbing-based policy could be faster, with more data subject to corruption
between two successive runs.
3.3.6 Error Detection and Correction
Pangolin provides error injection functions to emulate both hardware-uncorrectable
NVMM media errors and hardware-undetectable scribbles.
We initially developed Pangolin using conventional DRAM machines that lack sup-
port for injecting NVMM errors at the hardware level. Therefore, we use mprotect() and
SIGSEGV to emulate NVMM media errors and SIGBUS. When an NVMM file is DAX-mapped,
the injector can randomly choose a page that contains user-allocated objects, erase it, and call
mprotect(PROT NONE) on the page. Later, when the application reads the corrupted page, Pan-
golin intercepts SIGSEGV, changes the page to read/write mode, and restores the page’s data.
The injector function can also randomly corrupt a metadata region or a victim object to emulate
software-induced, scribble errors.
In both test cases, we observe Pangolin can successfully repair a victim page or an object
and resume normal program execution. In our evaluation using a 100 GB pool and 1 GB parity,
we measured 180 µs to repair a page of a page column.
We also intentionally introduce buffer overrun bugs in our applications and observe
that Pangolin can successfully detect them using micro-buffer canaries. The transaction then
aborts to prevent any NVMM corruption. We have also verified Pangolin is compatible with
AddressSanitizer for detecting buffer overrun bugs (when updating a micro-buffered object
exceeds its buffer’s boundary), if both Pangolin and its application code are compiled with
support.
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3.4 Discussion
Persistent memory promises dramatic increases in storage performance. However, it also
complicates data protection and fault tolerance with direct access from the user-space. In this
section, we discuss our anticipated challenges and Pangolin’s limitations.
Hardware vs. software protection. Advanced memory-protection techniques such
as Chipkill and RAIM [65] can provide better reliability than basic ECC at the hardware level.
But whether emerging NVMM modules will adopt these techniques is unclear, and because
they do not understand software-layer semantics, they cannot protect against scribbles caused by
software memory bugs. Implementing parity and checksum in Pangolin is necessary for providing
software-layer protection, but it inevitably sacrifices performance, as shown in our evaluation,
especially when updating parity. If the NVMM controller can perform such data-intensive tasks
with control from the software layer, it can reduce the performance penalty for fault tolerance.
Vulnerability windows. Although Pangolin provides a viable solution for software-
based NVMM fault-tolerance, it only enforces automatic checksum verification with the micro-
buffered access, that is, when using pgl open() or pgl tx open() functions. To preserve
performance for read-only workloads, Pangolin’s pgl get() function gives direct read access
to NVMM objects and does not perform checksum verification. Although Pangolin can still
repair hardware-detected media errors, it cannot discover silent data corruption when using
pgl get(). A time-based NVMM pool scrubbing mechanism can reduce vulnerability windows
with a performance hit.
Online recovery. Being able to repair media errors and corruptions online is critical
to providing high availability for NVMM-based applications. The asynchronous, signal-based
mechanism for notifying a user-space process about NVMM media errors raises great challenges
for online error recovery. Currently, Pangolin only allows one thread to perform any online
corruption recovery, and that thread must not be in the middle of updating any parity data.
60
Supporting multi-threaded online recovery, and allowing it to work when the thread has partially
written to NVMM would require complex reasoning about how to restore the data and its parity
to a consistent state, and may require some hardware- or kernel-level support for better error
notification mechanisms.
3.5 Related Work
In this section, we place Pangolin in context relative to previous projects that have explored
how to use NVMM effectively.
Transaction Support. All previous libraries for using NVMMs to build complex
objects rely on transactions for crash consistency. Although we built Pangolin on libpmemobj,
its techniques could be applied to another persistent object system. NV-Heaps [12], Atlas [10],
DCT [52], and libpmemobj [82] provide undo logging for applications to snapshot persistent
objects before making in-place updates. Mnemosyne [103], SoftWrAp [27], and DUDETM [59]
use variations of redo logging. REWIND [11] implements both undo and redo logging for
fine-grained, high-concurrent transactions. Log-structured NVMM [36] makes changes to objects
via append-only logs, and it does not require extra logging for consistency. Romulus [14] uses a
main-back mechanism to implement efficient redo log-based transactions.
None of these systems provide fault tolerance for NVMM errors. We believe they can
adopt Pangolin’s parity and checksum design to improve their resilience to NVMM errors at
low storage overhead. In Section 3.2.5 we described how to apply the hybrid parity updating
scheme to an undo logging-based system. Log-structured and copy-on-write systems can adopt
the techniques in similar ways.
Fault Tolerance. Both Pangolin and libpmemobj’s replication mode protect against
media errors, but Pangolin provides stronger protection and much lower space overhead. Further-
more, libpmemobj can only repair media errors offline, and it does not detect or repair software
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corruption to user objects.
NVMalloc [72] uses checksums to protect metadata. It does not specify whether applica-
tion data is also checksum-protected, and it does not provide any form of redundancy to repair
the corruption. NVMalloc uses mprotect() to protect NVMM pages while they are not mapped
for writing. Pangolin could adopt this technique to prevent an application from scribbling its own
persistent data structures.
The NOVA file system [104, 105] uses parity-based protection for file data. However, it
must disable these features for NVMM pages that are DAX-mapped for writing in user-space,
since the page’s contents can change without the file system’s knowledge, making it impossible
for NOVA to keep the parity information consistent if an application modifies DAX-mapped data.
As a result, Pangolin’s and NOVA’s fault tolerance mechanisms are complementary.
3.6 Conclusion
This work presents Pangolin, a fault-tolerant, DAX-mapped NVMM programming library
for applications to build complex data structures in NVMM. Pangolin uses a novel, space-efficient
layout of data and parity to protect arbitrary-sized NVMM objects combined with per-object
checksums to detect corruption. To maintain high performance, Pangolin uses micro-buffering,
carefully-chosen parity and checksum updating algorithms. As a result, Pangolin provides
stronger protection, better availability, and much lower storage overhead than existing NVMM
programming libraries.
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Chapter 4
PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer
Although DAX offers fast access to persistent data, ensuring crash consistency of data
stored in directly-mapped NVMM remains challenging. We define recovery bugs as NVMM-
specific programming errors that may cause unrecoverable data inconsistency after a crash.
Developing NVMM applications without recovery bugs requires programmers to carefully reason
about when and in what order data becomes persistent during program execution, explicitly
insert cache-line flushing and memory ordering instructions at proper locations in the source
code, and implement recovery methods to restore an NVMM image to a consistent state after a
crash. Moreover, it also demands special memory management mechanisms (e.g., atomic, crash-
consistent memory allocation) and transaction algorithms that are unique to NVMM programming.
Adding the required functionality introduces pervasive changes to existing programming practices,
and the subtleties involved open the door to a wide range of recovery bugs.
To address these challenges, industry and academia have proposed libraries [12, 14, 18, 36,
48, 59, 66, 82, 103, 108] to facilitate NVMM programming. They typically encapsulate low-level
cache-line operations in convenient library functions, provide NVMM allocators for memory
management, and support transactions to manage arbitrary-sized NVMM updates. Despite hiding
low-level details from programmers, NVMM libraries replace one set of challenges with another
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– using the libraries correctly. Recovery bugs also manifest with inappropriate usage of library
functions. The public commit history for Intel’s Persistent Memory Development Kit (PMDK)
example programs demonstrates how easily even the library designers can misuse them.
These challenges illustrate the need for effective NVMM recovery debugging tools.
However, most of existing NVMM debugging tools, such as PMemCheck [45], PMReorder [81],
and PMTest [60], share two major limitations: 1) lack of static analysis and 2) poor multi-threading
support. Without static analysis, tools must rely on instrumenting an NVMM program and running
dynamic analysis on a finite set of test cases. Therefore, the instrumentation effort and test case
quality significantly limit the testing coverage. Moreover, they often require programmers to
manually annotate the source code with testing constructs, steepening the learning curve, reducing
code readability and maintainability, and reducing portability. Finally, existing NVMM debugging
tools [45, 60, 81] provide little or no support for inter-thread bug analysis. PMemCheck and
PMReorder extend Valgrind [76], which serializes all threads with an emulated CPU, and does not
consider interactions between threads and transactions. PMTest also lacks inter-thread analyses.
To overcome the limitations of existing NVMM debugging tools, we propose PmemCon-
jurer and PmemSanitizer, debugging tools that combine both static and dynamic program analysis
for finding bugs in NVMM applications. PmemConjurer is a static analyzer using symbolic
execution to explore a program’s control flow graph and search for recovery bugs. To support
inter-thread analysis, PmemSanitizer adds compiler instrumentation to inject dynamic diagnosis
code into the program. An instrumented program will execute natively with threading, while
PmemSanitizer’s runtime library performs inter-thread analysis and store-reordering tests. This
chapter makes the following contributions:
1. Introduce static analysis for finding recovery bugs. PmemConjurer is the first tool
applying static analysis to debugging NVMM applications. We extend the Clang Static
Analyzer’s symbolic execution [61] to support recovery bug analysis.
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2. Detect recovery bugs in multi-threaded programs. PmemSanitizer supports multi-
threaded programs by injecting thread-safe analysis code into the target binary and per-
forming runtime inspection.
3. Support online store-reordering testing. PmemSanitizer supports store-reordering tests
to emulate crashes without terminating the running program.
4. Identify new bugs in PMDK examples. We discover eight unknown bugs in the example
programs of PMDK. The maintainers have accepted our patches to fix them.
In the following sections, we first introduce the background on NVMM programming and
program analysis in Section 4.1. Then, Section 4.2 presents the design overview. Section 4.3
and Section 4.4 describe implementation details for static and dynamic analysis, respectively.
Section 4.5 evaluates both tools’ bug-finding ability and runtime performance implications. Sec-
tion 4.6 compares PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer with related work, and finally, Section 4.7
concludes.
4.1 Background
In this section, we first provide a brief primer on NVMM programming and how recovery
bugs occur. Then, we describe Clang and LLVM’s program analysis frameworks that are relevant
to PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer.
4.1.1 NVMM Programming
NVMM programming faces challenges from two aspects: 1) a store to NVMM is not
guaranteed persistent due to volatile caches and on-CPU buffers, and 2) the order in which stores
actually update NVMM may not correspond to the program’s store ordering.
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1 struct node { | // PMEMoid is from libpmemobj
2 int in_use; | typedef struct pmemoid {
3 uint64_t key; | uint64_t pool_uuid_lo;
4 char val[128]; | uint64_t off;
5 PMEMoid next; | } PMEMoid;
6 }; |
7 --------------------------------------------------------
8 void insert(PMEMobjpool *pop, uint64_t key, char *val) {
9 PMEMoid head = pmemobj_root(pop, sizeof(struct node));
10 struct node *pnode = pmemobj_direct(head);
11
12 while (pnode ->in_use && !OID_IS_NULL(pnode ->next))
13 pnode = pmemobj_direct(pnode ->next);
14
15 if (pnode ->in_use) {
16 TX_BEGIN(pop) {
17 PMEMoid new_node = pmemobj_tx_alloc(/* args */);
18 TX_ADD_DIRECT(&pnode ->next); // Undo logging
19 pnode ->next = new_node;
20 pnode = pmemobj_direct(new_node);
21 pnode ->in_use = 0; // Initializing the new node
22 pnode ->next = OID_NULL;
23 } TX_END
24 }
25
26 pnode ->key = key;
27 strncpy(pnode ->val, val, 128);
28 pmem_flush(pnode , sizeof(struct node)); // Flush
29 pmem_drain(); // Memory barrier
30 pnode ->in_use = 1;
31 pmem_persist(&pnode ->in_use , 4); // Flush & Barrier
32 }
Figure 4.1: An NVMM programming example - The insert function finds the first unused
node in an NVMM linked list to store a key-value pair.
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Figure 4.1 demonstrates an NVMM programming example using functions from PMDK
to tackle these challenges. The insert function finds the first unused node in an NVMM linked
list to store a key-value pair. If all nodes are in use, it allocates a new node and inserts it to the
tail with a transaction.
PMDK is a collection of multiple libraries. Libpmem provides low-level functions
(named with the pmem prefix) wrapping machine-dependent instructions for cache-line operations.
Libpmemobj functions (with the pmemobj prefix) are higher-level, object-oriented, and support
memory management and transactions. This chapter focuses on libpmem and libpmemobj and
we refer to them collectively as PMDK.
NVMM pointers and objects. Libpmemobj’s programming model uses PMEMoid
instead of a native C-style pointer to refer to persistent objects. A PMEMoid consists of an 8-byte
file UUID and an 8-byte offset that gives its location within a memory-mapped file. The function
pmemobj direct converts a PMEMoid into a void * pointer for direct memory access. An object
type for NVMM (e.g., struct node) is mostly the same as its conventional form, except pointer
fields are PMEMoid type.
Atomic NVMM updates. The insertion logic on lines 26 - 31 uses libpmem functions
for crash consistency. It first ensures a node’s key-value data is persistent by explicitly flushing
updates (line 28) and enforcing memory ordering (line 29). It then atomically sets the in use
flag to validate the node’s data (lines 30 and 31). Since x86 processors guarantee aligned, 8-byte
stores atomically update NVMM [44], a crash between lines 26 - 31 either results in a fully
populated node or an unused one ready for a new key-value pair.
Libpmemobj transactions. Allocating a new node and inserting it to the linked list in-
volves object allocation and modifications more complex than a single 8-byte write. Libpmemobj
provides the transactional interface illustrated in lines 16 - 23. TX BEGIN and TX END macros
wrap library functions to control a transaction’s progression. Inside the transaction, the program
68
does not have to invoke flushing or ordering functions explicitly. Instead, it must make calls to
TX ADD DIRECT (or similar ones) to create undo-logs before modifying any existing NVMM data
(line 19). The undo log-based transaction mechanism serves two purposes: 1) flushing logged
(hence modified) ranges on transaction commit, or 2) restoring the logged data if a transaction
aborts or crashes. A newly allocated object (line 17) does not require logging, but a transaction
should initialize it (lines 21 and 22) before it commits. Transactions can nest, and the outer-most
transaction commits all nested ones.
Transactions and threading. Multi-threading interacts with libpmemobj’s transac-
tions in two ways: 1) a transaction spawns and joins concurrent worker threads, or 2) concurrent
worker threads create thread-local transactions. In the first case, a libpmemobj transaction
commits NVMM updates from all threads as a group, and we refer to them as “grouped transac-
tions.” Transactions of the second form are mutually independent, so we call them “independent
transactions.”
Examples of recovery bugs. Considering Figure 4.1 without one or more of the lines
with comments illustrates many potential bugs. Without undo logging (line 18), a crash before the
transaction commit can render the old data of pnode->next unrecoverable. Dropping the flush
or memory barrier on lines 28 and 29 may cause pnode->in use to be true in NVMM before the
key-value pair becomes persistent, mislabeling invalid data as valid. We define more types of
recovery bugs in Section 4.2.
4.1.2 Program Analysis Frameworks in Clang and LLVM
PmemConjurer extends the symbolic execution of the Clang Static Analyzer (CSA) [61]
to find recovery bugs and PmemSanitizer adds an LLVM [56] IR-level instrumentation pass to
inject dynamic analysis code into the target binary. Below, we briefly introduce their operation.
Although many CSA- and LLVM-based debugging tools exist, as far as we know, no prior works
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have applied them detecting NVMM programming bugs.
Clang Static Analyzer. CSA works on a program’s control flow graph (CFG) before
generating LLVM’s intermediate representation (IR). CSA’s core engine uses symbolic execution
to simulate a program’s execution by traversing its CFG and progressively building a graph of
reachable program states. Each node of the graph corresponds to a program point in the source
code and contains information about the simulated program’s state.
CSA implements a region-based memory model [106], and during the simulated execution,
it interprets variables and memory objects as symbolic values or symbolic memory regions. In
Figure 4.1, head represents a variable region of function insert’s stack frame, and it stores
a symbolic value (PMEMoid type) returned by pmemobj root. Each pointer symbol in CSA
corresponds to a memory region of a program’s address space. Taking the address of a stack-
allocated variable (e.g., &head) generates a pointer for a call-stack region, and the return value of
malloc or new represents a heap region. Generally, a pointer returned by a function unknown to
CSA (the case of calling pmemobj direct) represents an unknown region.
Symbolic values may have constraints depending on the execution path. For example,
the value of pnode->in use is unbounded (can be any 32-bit value) before the if statement.
Symbolic execution bifurcates at conditional branches and associates path constraints with
symbolic values. Therefore, the true-path of the if statement constraints pnode->in use to be
non-zero values and the false-path bounds it to zero.
CSA handles loops by iterating a constant number of times (by default 4). For each
iteration, if CSA can deterministically resolve the termination condition, it either continues
within the loop or breaks out accordingly. Otherwise, CSA assumes both paths are possible and
associates path constraints with related symbolic values. For the while loop in Figure 4.1, CSA
analyzes both paths for every iteration because values of pnode->in use and pnode->next are
not statically available.
On top of CSA’s symbolic execution engine, it allows a checker plugin to attach to various
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Table 4.1: Rules that PmemConjurer or PmemSanitizer automatically checks for correct NVMM
programming
Rule Description Statically Checkable
1 A program must partially or fully flush any modified NVMM object. Yes
1a A flush operation’s target must be an NVMM address. Yes
1b The flushed size must be no less than the target’s size (if typed). Yes
2 Code in a libpmemobj transaction must log an object before modifying it. Yes
3 A transaction must initialize newly allocated NVMM objects before commit. Yes
4 A program must not use effectively deallocated NVMM objects. Yes
5 Independent transactions must not log the same object or NVMM range. No
6 Reordering stores in-between memory barriers must not cause unrecoverable inconsistency. No
program points in the source code by implementing callback functions. These program points
can be before or after making a function call, reading or writing a memory location, and at the
exit of a function, etc. A checker’s callback function can implement debugging logic to analyze
the program’s current state. Multiple checkers exist for finding conventional programming errors,
such as null pointer dereferencing and use-after-free.
LLVM instrumentation and dynamic analysis. Before the machine-code generation,
LLVM can instrument a program’s IR for runtime profiling or debugging. An LLVM’s instrumen-
tation pass injects probing functions before or after its interested program statements, and the
linker links instrumented object files with a related runtime analysis library. A widely adopted set
of tools based on this principle is the sanitizer series. For example, AddressSanitizer [94] and
ThreadSanitizer [20] detect out-of-bound memory accesses and data races, respectively. A user
can enable a particular sanitizer tool with compile-time and link-time switches for Clang.
4.2 Design Overview
PmemConjurer extends CSA’s symbolic execution to perform NVMM-specific static
analysis and PmemSanitizer adds a sanitizer-like dynamic debugging tool to complement the
static analyzer with multi-threading support and store-reordering tests. Figure 4.2 illustrates their
components in the compilation flow. They perform program analysis at two independent phases:
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Target.c
AST
Clang
CFG
LLVM IR
...
pmsan_store_probe()
MOV dst1 src1
pmsan_store_probe()
MOV dst2 src2
pmsan_flush_probe()
CLWB dst1 
pmsan_analysis()
SFENCE
...
PmemConjurer Bug Report
Bug Reportexecute
Instrumented binary
recovery-and-check
setenv
PmemSanitizer 
Runtime
PmenSanitizer 
Pass
Linking
Figure 4.2: PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer design overview
the static analyzer runs on each source file’s control flow graph before LLVM IR generation, and
the dynamic analysis runs when executing an instrumented binary. A user can selectively enable
them either with compile-time switches or runtime environment variables.
In this section, we first describe the programming rules that PmemConjurer or PmemSani-
tizer checks for detecting recovery bugs and then introduce how to use them when developing
NVMM applications.
4.2.1 Automatically-checked NVMM Programming Rules
The rules are based on the NVM programming model [95] and PMDK’s library function
semantics. PmemConjurer or PmemSanitizer detects rule violations and reports them as recovery
bugs. Table 4.1 presents a summary of the rules. In the description below, we refer to lines in
Figure 4.1 to show examples of recovery bugs.
Rule-1: A program must partially or fully flush any modified NVMM object. Out-
side a transaction, a program should explicitly flush modified NVMM ranges at some point (see
below). Otherwise, the updates may still reside in CPU caches. Inside a transaction, we check
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Rule-2 instead of Rule-1 because the transaction mechanism automatically flushes modified
ranges (see Section 4.1.1).
PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer both track written NVMM regions and check this rule
at memory barriers (e.g., line 29 and 31). Because the static analyzer works on each source file
independently, it also checks this rule when a top-level function (without a caller in the same
source file) returns. PmemSanitizer also checks it when a running program terminates.
The size of the area that needs to be flushed can be challenging for a debugging tool
to infer because we account for transient fields (i.e., non-persistent) in an otherwise-persistent
object. We adopt different strategies for static and dynamic analysis. PmemConjurer assumes any
modified NVMM object should be flushed at least once, despite the offset and size, at the next
verification point. PmemSanitizer adopts a more aggressive strategy: the flushed ranges should
fully cover modified NVMM data. To compensate for possible missed bugs in PmemConjurer,
we define two additional statically checkable rules for flushing: Rule-1a and Rule-1b.
Rule-1a: A flush operation’s target must be an NVMM address. Flushing non-
NVMM address ranges, such as the call stack or malloc’ed memory, does not, in itself, threaten
crash consistency, but it is pointelss and it may indicate a programming error (e.g., if the target of
the call should have been NVMM data). For instance, writing line 28 to pmem flush(&pnode,
..) violates this rule, because it flushes the variable pnode’s stack address rather than its pointed
NVMM location.
Rule-1b: The flushed size must be no less than the target’s size (if typed). When
a flush function’s target is a typed region (lines 28 and 31), we expect the flushed size to be
no smaller than the data type’s size. For instance, a violation occurs if line 28 changes to
pmem flush(pnode, sizeof(pnode)), because the data type that pnode points to is struct
node, but the flushed size is the size of a single pointer.
Rule-2: Code in a libpmemobj transaction must log an object before modifying it.
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Modifying existing NVMM objects without logging may cause unrecoverable data inconsistency
if a crash happens before the transaction commits. Similar to flush checking, PmemConjurer
expects at least logging some field of a modified object, and PmemSanitizer checks if all modified
data has been logged.
Rule-3: A transaction must initialize newly allocated NVMM objects before commit.
Some of libpmemobj’s allocation functions (line 17) do not zero-out the memory block so it
may contain garbage data. When the program allocates an object in a libpmemobj transaction,
PmemConjurer checks for two types of actions before the transaction commits: 1) the transaction
allocates and initializes it using library functions like pmemobj tx zalloc, or 2) the transaction
writes to some field of the object. If neither of the two presents (e.g., removing lines 21 - 22), it
reports a bug.
Rule-4: A program must not use effectively deallocated NVMM objects. Use-after-
free bugs are a common problem, but NVMM complicates their detection within transactions
because deallocation does not take effect until a transaction commits. PmemConjurer models this
deferred behavior and detects accesses to effectively freed objects.
Rule-5: Independent transactions must not log the same object or NVMM range.
Independent transactions are thread-local, and each worker function has its own undo logs.
Allowing two threads to log the same data may compromise data consistency if one transaction
commits its update, while the other fails and reverts the same object to a logged version. This
recovery bug does not always imply a data race, so conventional data racing checkers are not
sufficient.
Rule-6: Reordering stores in-between memory barriers must not cause unrecov-
erable inconsistency. This rule detects missing memory barriers, (e.g., omitting line 29).
Because stores between two memory barriers do not have ordering constraints, a crash may
result in any subset of the stores becoming persistent. Thus, if any subset of the stores causes
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# PmemConjurer - Static analysis
clang --analyze -Xanalyzer -analyzer -checker=pmem src1.c
clang --analyze -Xanalyzer -analyzer -checker=pmem src2.c
# PmemSanitizer - Dynamic analysis
clang src1.c src2.c -O3 -ggdb -fsanitize=pmem -o target
PMSAN_OPTIONS="rcprog=’./recovery -and-check nvmmfile’ reorder=
RevertSingle" ./target nvmmfile
Figure 4.3: Examples using PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer
unrecoverable inconsistency, a program’s implementation is not crash-consistent. Checking this
rule requires the user to provide a consistency-checking program for PmemSanitizer’s dynamic
analyzer to run for each ordering test case. We explain the details of this testing method in
Section 4.4.
4.2.2 Using PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer
We design PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer to be easily adoptable. The target users
are developers using libpmem, libpmemobj, or compiler intrinsics for cache operations. It
automatically checks the programming rules above without need of annotating the source code.
A user can enable the PmemConjurer static analyzer by specifying pmem as the checker
name when invoking Clang Static Analyzer. CSA supports inter-procedural analysis by inlining
callee functions, but currently, it does not support cross-file analysis. Thus, PmemConjurer also
has to analyze each source file independently. We add -fsanitize=pmem to Clang and Clang++
as a compile-time switch for enabling PmemSanitizer’s IR-level instrumentation. The same
switch also works for linking PmemSanitizer’s runtime analysis library.
An PmemSanitizer-instrumented binary checks the PMSAN OPTIONS environment when
it starts running (before entering main), Its value configures PmemSanitizer’s runtime library,
including the recovery-and-check program, its arguments, and reordering strategy. Figure 4.3
illustrates how to use PmemSanitizer at compile time and run the instrumented binary.
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4.3 PmemConjurer
PmemConjurer modifies the core of CSA and implements an NVMM-specific checker
with the following capabilities.
1. Identify NVMM regions via pointer symbols.
2. Track NVMM objects via PMEMoid and derived symbols.
3. Emulate NVMM-specific functions and memory accesses.
4. Analyze recovery bugs at various program points.
In this section, we explain some implementation details of PmemConjurer’s static analyzer design.
4.3.1 NVMM Regions and Region Symbols
CSA does not distinguish stores to NVMM and other memory regions. To resolve it,
we modify CSA’s core to add a new type of memory region called NVMMSpaceRegion and
designate certain functions as returning pointers to NVMM regions, including pmem map file,
pmemobj open, and pmemobj direct. PmemSanitizer’s static checker attaches to these function
call sites during symbolic execution and creates a pointer-type symbol (RegSym) representing an
NVMMSpaceRegion for the returned address. PmemConjurer assumes that pointers from other
sources (e.g., taking the address of a stack variable or calling malloc), point to volatile memory.
In Figure 4.1, pmemobj direct on line 10 returns a RegSym. The assignment on line
10 stores the symbol to the stack variable pnode. CSA can extract this symbol stored in pnode
until reassigning it on line 13 or 20. If another variable copies pnode’s value, it acquires the
same RegSym. A derived pointer (e.g., &pnode->next) inherits its origin’s NVMMSpaceRegion
property, and PmemConjurer can extract the RegSym for the underlying pointer.
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4.3.2 NVMM Objects and Object Symbols
We track NVMM objects using PMEMoid symbols and their derived symbols. A PMEMoid
symbol can originate from multiple sources, for instance, function’s return value, function’s
arguments, and struct fields or array elements of PMEMoid type (e.g., pnode->next). PmemCon-
jurer creates new NVMM object symbols (ObjSym) for function-returned PMEMoid values (e.g.,
pmemobj root and pmemobj tx alloc). Reading a PMEMoid-typed memory location does not
always generate a new ObjSym. For example, reading new node on line 19 and 20 retrieves the
ObjSym created for pmemobj tx alloc. In contrast, the first read from a memory location with
unknown value (e.g., pnode->next) creates a new ObjSym, and the next reading from the same
location gets the same ObjSym before reassigning pnode.
Derived ObjSyms mainly come from casting a PMEMoid to a C union termed TOID [80]
(short for typed PMEMoid) by libpmemobj for encoding NVMM object types. CSA currently
does not handle casting-to-union statements, and PmemConjurer lifts this restriction by creating a
new ObjSym for the casting result and mapping it to the same RegSym of the PMEMoid symbol
(see below).
4.3.3 NVMMRegionState and Symbol Mappings
One challenge for symbolic execution to analyze NVMM-specific code is that a pro-
gram can access the same NVMM object either via a PMEMoid variable or its raw pointer, as
shown in Listing 4.1. By default, CSA would create a new symbol as the return value for each
pmemobj direct call, ignoring the correlation between ptr1 and ptr2. PmemConjurer avoids
this problem by creating an NVMMRegionState data structure and accessing them via a two-level
mapping mechanism.
Each RegSym corresponds to an NVMMRegionState data structure (Figure 4.4) describing
the region. NVMMRegionState tracks the type of its NVMM region. MapRegion represents
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RegSymObjSym
NvmmRegionState
RegStateMapObjRegMap
Type: MapRegion, or  
Existing, or  
NewAlloc, or  
Invalid
Freed: Yes or No
Logged: Yes or No
Modified: Yes or No
Figure 4.4: NVMMRegionState and two-level symbol mapping. This mechanism helps Pmem-
Conjurer recognize changes to the same NVMM region via either PMEMoid or pointer variables.
the region of a mapping function call (e.g., pmem map file or pmemobj open) that is not related
to a particular object. The Existing and NewAlloc types correspond to objects from different
sources (see Section 4.3.4). A region’s type becomes Invalid after unmapping or deallocation.
NVMMRegionState also records various properties that change according to program statements.
1 struct node *ptr1 = pmemobj_direct(head);
2 struct node *ptr2 = pmemobj_direct(head);
3 TX_ADD(head); // Undo -log: ObjSym for the head node
4 ptr1 ->in_use = 0; // Store: RegSym + offset_of(in_use)
5 ptr2 ->next = OID_NULL; // Store: RegSym + offset_of(next)
Listing 4.1: PmemConjurer recognizes the two pointers referencing the same memory location,
and the last three lines operate on the same object.
Two-level symbol mapping uses one hashmap (ObjRegMap) to map an ObjSym to a
RegSym, and another hashmap (RegStateMap) redirects a RegSym to an NVMMRegionState
instance. We model pmemobj direct so that it queries the ObjRegMap to retrieve and return
an existing RegSym as its result pointer. If the mapping does not exist, we know that an
untracked, existing object appears in the program and create a new set of ObjSym, RegSym, and
NVMMRegionState mappings for it. When a program statement reads or writes memory locations,
PmemConjurer extracts the RegSym from the address variable and uses the RegStateMap to
retrieve its NVMMRegionState. Functions operating on PMEMoid query the ObjRegMap followed
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Table 4.2: Program statements, NVMMRegionState transitions, and conditions for rule viola-
tions
Program statement NVMMRegionState transitions Rules to check and conditions for violations
Memory read N/A
Rule-4: Destination region’s type is Invalid.
Memory write Modified: No→ Yes
Rule-2: (TxLevel > 0) Object is Existing type but not logged.
Any flush function Modified: Yes→ No Rule-1a: Destination’s address is not from NVMMSpaceRegion.
Flush function with size Modified: Yes→ No Rule-1b: Flushed size is less than the destination’s type size.
Memory barrier
N/A Rule-1: Any tracked NVMMRegionState is modified.
Top-level function return
Unmapping function Type: MapRegion→ Invalid
N/A
TX BEGIN TxLevel→ TxLevel + 1
TX ADD (or similar) Logged: No→ Yes
TX FREE Freed: No→ Yes
TX END (TxLevel ¿ 1) TxLevel→ TxLevel - 1
TX END (TxLevel == 1)
TxLevel→ 0
Rule-3: Any tracked object is NewAlloc type but not modified.
Type: NewAlloc→ Existing
Type: Any (Freed)→ Invalid
Logged: Yes→ No
Modified (Logged): Yes→ No
by the RegStateMap. This mechanism ensures the last three lines of Listing 4.1 update and
analyze information of the same object.
4.3.4 Emulating Function Calls and Memory Accesses
PmemConjurer recognizes NVMM-specific functions and models their behaviors ac-
cording to their semantics. Most libpmemobj functions that return PMEMoid retrieve existing
NVMM objects (Existing type). The exceptions are allocator functions which make new ones
(NewAlloc type). TX ADD and TX FREE functions1 update the Modified and Freed properties of an
NVMMRegionState, respectively. Memory writes and allocator functions that zero-out a new
object set the Modified property, and a flush function or a transaction commit resets it.
In addition to tracking region and object symbols, PmemConjurer also tracks the trans-
action context during symbolic execution using a variable called TxLevel. It increments with a
TX BEGIN function and decrements at TX END. The TX END for the outermost transaction (TxLevel
== 1) commits all nested transactions. At commit, PmemConjurer iterates over its tracked
NVMMRegionState instances and update them if necessary. Table 4.2 presents details of NVMM-
1We use short macro names during the discussion but CSA actually analyzes the underlying functions.
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TxLevel: 0 TxLevel: 0
TxLevel: 1TxLevel: 1
TxLevel: 1 TxLevel: 1
L16: TX_BEGIN
L19: pnode->next = new_node;
L9: pmemobj_root
L18: TX_ADD_DIRECT
BUG:
Type: Existing
Logged: No
Modified: No
Root object
not tracked
Type: Existing
Logged: No
Modified: No
Type: Existing
Logged: Yes
Modified: No
Type: Existing
Logged: Yes
Modified: Yes
Type: Existing
Logged: No
Modified: Yes
1 2
3
6
4
5
Figure 4.5: PmemConjurer’s analysis flow for the root object in Figure 4.1.
RegionState transitions.
4.3.5 Rule-checking with NVMMRegionState
The state that PmemConjurer tracks during symbolic execution allows it to enforce most
of the rules listed in Section 4.2.1. Table 4.2 describes the points at which PmemConjurer checks
for rule violations. Figure 4.5 illustrates CSA’s symbolic execution and PmemConjurer’s analysis
flow for the “root” object (the list’s head node) in Figure 4.1. Each block in Figure 4.5 shows how
PmemConjurer tracks program state, including the transaction-nesting level and the root object’s
NVMMRegionState. The state transition corresponds to the execution path following lines 9 - 12,
without going into the while loop and then taking the if statement’s true-branch (lines 15 - 19).
PmemConjurer starts tracking the root object when pmemobj root returns and treats
it as an existing object. Variables head and pnode get the root object’s ObjSym and RegSym,
respectively. PmemConjurer checks Rule-2 when memory writes happen, and TxLevel is non-zero.
If a memory writer’s target address derives from a tracked RegSym, and its NVMMRegionState
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is not logged, PmemConjurer reports a violation. State 6 shows an error state caused by leaving
out line 18 of Figure 4.1.
4.3.6 Limitations of PmemConjurer’s Static Analysis
Although PmemConjurer’s static analysis can find many kinds of bugs, it does have
limitations in reasoning about thread interactions and store ordering constraints.
PmemConjurer’s symbolic execution does not consider interactions between threads.
Thus, it does not detect a violation of Rule-5 since it cannot decide if two object symbols from
two separate threads reference the same NVMM object.
The static analysis cannot infer store ordering constraints. Some NVMM programs
require explicit memory barriers to enforce the ordering about when stores become persistent,
such as using pmem drain in Figure 4.1. Store ordering constraints are difficult for static analysis
to infer because the code lacks description about its logic to maintain crash consistency. For
example, it cannot decide if there should be a memory barrier between stores to pnode->key and
pnode->val, because that depends on what actions the recovery code takes after a crash.
PmemSanitizer’s dynamic analysis complements PmemConjurer to overcome these limiti-
tions by providing multi-threading support and store-reordering testing for detecting ordering-
related bugs.
4.4 PmemSanitizer
PmemSanitizer aims to complement PmemConjurer by providing multi-threading and
store ordering analysis. It also performs more precise checks on flushing and logging sizes.
PmemSanitizer uses an LLVM IR instrumentation pass to inject probe or analysis functions
before program statements that access or manage NVMM. Figure 4.2 shows some of the inserted
functions as they appear in the target program’s assembly. The probe functions are thread-safe so
81
that PmemSanitizer can analyze concurrent programs.
4.4.1 Instrumentation and Runtime Analysis
PmemSanitizer probes PMDK functions that memory-map NVMM to get the actual
address and size of each mapped NVMM region. It also probes all memory writes, cache flushes,
and transaction logging functions to collect the range of addresses they affect. PmemSanitizer’s
probe function collects thread-local information and assigns each operation a timestamp to track
ordering among them. For a store operation, such as a variable assignment or calling a memory-
altering function (e.g., memcpy or memset), PmemSanitizer records its destination’s old contents
for reordering tests (see Section 4.4.3).
PmemSanitizer performs rule-checking at two points: 1) when a transaction commits,
or 2) at a memory barrier. When a transaction is about to commit (e.g., just before calling
pmemobj tx commit), PmemSanitizer gathers modified NVMM ranges from all threads and
checks if they have overlaps (violating Rule-5). It also verifies Rule-2 with more accuracy than
the static analysis. At a memory barrier, PmemSanitizer verifies Rule-1 with concrete store/flush
sizes and performs reordering tests to check Rule-6 (see below).
4.4.2 Supporting Threaded Programs
PmemSanitizer’s dynamic analysis supports multi-threaded programs by collecting thread-
local information in each probe function and retrospectively analyzing their interactions in an
analysis function (any thread).
For coordinating probe and analysis functions, PmemSanitizer uses a global reader/writer
in an unconventional way: probe functions take the “reader” access to collect thread-local
information, while the analysis function takes “writer” access before starting analyzing, so other
threads cannot perform stores to NVMM or any instrumented NVMM-specific operations.
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This technique allows the concurrent execution of multiple program threads. It does
have the limitation of not catching a bug if a particular runtime schedule serializes all threads’
execution, but this rarely happens during our evaluation on modern multi-core machines. In
contrast, PMemCheck or PMReorder runs a target program using Valgrind, which serializes
threads [76] and does not consider interactions between threads.
4.4.3 Online Reordering Tests
PmemSanitizer performs store-reordering tests at memory barriers to test the program’s
ability to recover after a crash. Figure 4.6 is the implementation of PmemSanitizer’s store-
probe and ordering-testing functions. Function pmsan probe store runs before each store and
assigns a timestamp to each store operation and records the store destination’s old contents. In
pmsan analysis, it gathers stores from all threads and selectively (see below) reverts some
of them to emulate a crash before this memory barrier takes effect (when all stores become
persistent).
RevertSingle: (), (A, B), (A, C), (B, C), (A, B, C)
RevertAccumulative: (A, B, C), (B, C), (C), ()
Listing 4.2: Reordering test cases for three stores: A, B, and C.
Reordering strategy. At runtime, the “reorder” value of PMSAN OPTIONS dictates
PmemSanitizer how to revert stores. PmemSanitizer supports two strategies: “RevertSingle”
reverts each individual store, and “RevertAccumulative” reverts stores accumulatively in the order
specified by their timestamps. Supposing A, B, and C represent the three stores on line 26, 27, and
30 of Figure 4.1 and that the memory barrier on line 29 is missing, Listing 4.2 demonstrates test
cases generated for them using different strategies. Although the program executes the stores in
sequence, they do not necessary become persistent in the same order. Each tuple in Listing 4.2
indicates a test case where only shown stores are persistent when a crash happens. Function
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1 pmsan_store_probe(uint64_t dst, size_t size) {
2 if (!is_nvmm_range(dst, size))
3 return;
4 std::shared_lock probe(pmsan_lock);
5 record_dst_contents(dst, size);
6 }
(a) Probe function for stores
1 pmsan_analysis() {
2 std::unique_lock analysis(pmsan_lock);
3 gather_thread_local_stores();
4 while (next_reorder()) {
5 pit_t child = fork();
6 if (child == 0)
7 execv("recovery -and-check", args);
8 waitpid(child , &status , 0);
9 if (!exited_normally(status))
10 report_ordering_bug();
11 }
12 }
(b) Analysis function (only showing the reordering logic)
Figure 4.6: Reordering tests implementation (gists only).
next reorder (Figure 4.6-b) generates a sequence of all test cases according to the selected
strategy.
Online testing. For each test case, the parent process forks to run the recovery-and-
check program (specified via PMSAN OPTIONS) in the child process. The recovery-and-check
program is also PmemSanitizer-instrumented, and it communicates with the parent via shared
memory. For each store to revert of a test case, the child restores the contents of its affected range
before the store happened, effectively emulating a store that did not become persistent because of
a crash. Then, the child process executes the recovery code and the consistency-check routine.
The parent process reaps the child and checks its exit status to determine whether it recovered
successfully.
Recovery-and-check program. The recovery-and-check program should perform
crash recovery and then apply a consistency check on the resulting data. For Figure 4.1, the pro-
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gram would verify the following: when pnode->in use is true, the string length of pnode->val
should be non-zero. Those checks would detect inconsistent results produced by test cases (C) or
(A, C).
PmemSanitizer has two additional requirements for the recovery-and-check program: 1)
it must memory-map the same NVMM file with flag MAP PRIVATE, and 2) it must return zero
from main for a successful recovery or non-zero for failure. The first requirement prevents the
recovery procedure from modifying the shared NVMM data. The second one lets PmemSanitizer
recognize a successful recovery by checking the child process’ exit status.
After each test case, PmemSanitizer reports a bug if the test case is not recoverable. In
any case, it continues producing any remaining test cases.
4.5 Results
We evaluate PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer from the following perspectives:
1. Can they detect a wide range of recovery bugs?
2. What is the impact on compilation and execution time?
3. How frequent are the false-negatives and false-positives?
4.5.1 Detecting Recovery Bugs
We evaluate PmemConjurer’ and PmemSanitizer’s bug detection abilities using both
fabricated bugs and known ones from the PMDK repository. To generate test cases, we use
libpmem, libpmemobj, and compiler intrinsics to build test programs (e.g., Figure 4.1), and
then manually introduce bugs for testing. They detect all of the fabricated bugs except those
crafted specifically to elicit a false-negative bug detection. To test them on real-world bugs, we
searched PMDK’s commit messages (more than 8000) for keywords like “fix” or “bug” to find
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Table 4.3: Detecting previously fixed bugs in PMDK examples - We browsed PMDK’s commit
history and found 19 recovery bugs, including ones described by PMTest [60]. PmemConjurer
and PmemSanitizer can identify all of them.
Violation Short description Bugs
Rule-1 Missing flush 1
Rule-2 Missing logging 5
Rule-3 No initialization 13
Rule-4 Use-after-free 0
Rule-5 Logging race 0
Rule-6 Missing barrier 0
Not checkable by our tools 0
Total 19
Table 4.4: New bugs detected by PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer in PMDK examples
Violation Short description Source files Bugs
Rule-1 Missing flush array.c [34] 1
Rule-1a Flushing stack obj cpp ptr.cpp [28] 1
Rule-1b Incomplete flush pi.c [29], hashmap rp.c [33] 2
Rule-2 Missing logging rtree map.c [30, 32] 3
Rule-4 Use-after-free hashmap tx.c [31] 1
previously fixed recovery bugs. We also tested PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer against the
bugs described in the evalutation of PMTest [60]. Table 4.3 summarizes the 19 bugs we collected
from PMDK commit logs (excluding new ones found by us). We validate that PmemConjurer
and PmemSanitizer can correctly identify all of them. Its static analyzer overlooks one of them
(see Section 4.5.3), but the dynamic analyzer catches it.
To search for new bugs, we ran PmemConjurer’s static analyzer on 42 C and 24 C++
source files containing example code from the pmem/pmdk and pmem/pmdk-examples GitHub
repositoires. We found eight new bugs. Table 4.4 summarizes them. PmemSanitizer’s dynamic
analysis also finds the Rule-1 and Rule-2 violations in Table 4.4. We have submitted patches to
fix the bugs to the PMDK maintainers and they have accepted all of them.
We have not found bugs violating Rule-5 or Rule-6, partially due to practical programs
using independent transactions or just relying on store ordering for crash consistency are rare. We
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Figure 4.7: Reletive slowdown using different dynamic analysis tools - PmemSanitizer’s
dynamic analysis causes 4.5× slowdown on average.
have created our own test programs with these bugs and PmemSanitizer can successfully detect
them.
Bugs appear less often in PMDK’s C++ programs and our investigation shows C++ bind-
ings for libpmemobj have made it less error-prone. For example, in a transaction implemented
in C++, the programmer does not have to explicitly invoke logging functions before modifying
NVMM objects. The C++ library provides smart pointers with operator overloading to perform
object-level logging automatically.
4.5.2 Performance
PmemConjurer’s static analyzer runs on programs’ control flow graphs before generating
the LLVM IR. Its analysis time varies between less-than-one to around ten seconds depending
on each source file’s length and complexity of its CFG. It works offline and does not impact the
program’s runtime performance.
We evaluate the performance impact of PmemSanitizer’s dynamic analysis on a machine
with one 8-core Xeon E3-1270v6 and 32 GB main memory. The CPU provides the CLFLUSHOPT
instruction for flushing modified cache lines to NVMM’s persistence domain, and the SFENCE
instruction to ensure memory ordering. We configure 16 GB of the memory to emulated NVMM.
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Figure 4.8: Scalability with independent transactions modifying 64-byte objects - Baseline
indicates the throughput of the benchmark without any debugging instrumentation.
We run NOVA [104] as the DAX-enabling file system, and applications use mmap() to access
NVMM-resident files.
We use seven mapping data structures (Figure 4.7) and their benchmark programs included
in the latest PMDK repository to measure PmemSanitizer’s performance and compare it to the
baseline, PMTest, and PMemCheck.
The baseline contains normally-compiled benchmarks without any instrumentation. We
evaluate PmemSanitizer by instrumenting the benchmarks at compile-time and running them on
the test machine. PMemCheck is an extension to Valgrind, and we run the baseline programs on
top of Valgrind with the tool enabled. PMTest requires manually instrumenting both libpmemobj
and the benchmark programs, and it only supports an old version of PMDK. Therefore, we report
relative slowdown factors for each tool, compared to their corresponding baseline.
Figure 4.7 shows PmemSanitizer’s dynamic analysis causes 4.5× slowdown on average.
That is 3.3× slower than PMTest since PMTest only instruments NVMM writes but PmemSani-
tizer also has to filter DRAM stores at runtime. PMTest does not have results for rtree and skiplist
since they do not exist in its supported PMDK version. PMemCheck is more than 10× worse
than the other two due to Valgrind’s emulated execution.
We also create a threaded benchmark to evaluate PmemSanitizer’s impact. In Figure 4.8,
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each thread executes one transaction that is independent of other threads and overwrites an
existing 64-byte NVMM object, and we vary the number of threads. The instrumented program
does not scale well because PmemSanitizer acquires a global mutex (see Section 4.4.2) to perform
inter-thread analysis when any thread commits a transaction.
4.5.3 False-Negatives
1 static PMEMoid alloc_int(size_t size) {
2 for (int i = 0; i < size; i++)
3 D_RW(array)[i] = i;
4 pmemobj_persist(pop, D_RW(array), sizeof(*D_RW(array)));
5 return array.oid;
6 }
Listing 4.3: False-negative: PmemConjurer does not report a bug because it assumes just
flushing the array’s first element is fine. But this function should flush a range of length size *
sizeof(*D RW(array)).
In our experiments, PmemSanitizer’s false-negatives (i.e., a overlooked bug) are rare in
real-world code. Listing 4.3 shows the only false-negative our static analyzer produced among
the bugs in Table 4.3. The pmemobj persist function should flush all modified elements of
the array but its size parameter is only for the first element. PmemConjurer does not report
partially-flushed objects because it assumes NVMM objects can contain transient fields that
do not require persistence. Whether the function should flush all modified elements or just the
first one is application-specific, so program analysis cannot make the correct inference without
additional information.
PmemSanitizer reports any modified but unflushed range, so it does not overlook this bug
as long as the program executes the function.
In general, for any dynamic analysis tool (not just PmemSanitizer), a major cause for
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false-negatives is that test cases do not execise problematic code paths. PmemSanitizer’s inter-
thread may also miss some violations of Rule-5 if the dynamic execution schedule for two threads
happens to prevent the error from occurring.
4.5.4 False-Positives
Our static analyzer reports false alarms mainly because some information is unavailable
in one single source file. One example shown in Listing 4.4 shows using a function pointer to
initialize a newly allocated object. Because the function pointer’s implementation is in a separate
source file, PmemConjurer cannot determine if it does the initialization and reports a violation of
Rule-3.
1 int btree_map_insert_new(.., void (*constructor)(..)) {
2 TX_BEGIN(pop) {
3 PMEMoid n = pmemobj_tx_alloc (..);
4 constructor(pop, pmemobj_direct(n), ..);
5 ..
6 } TX_END
7 }
Listing 4.4: False-positive 1: The static analyzer cannot analyze functions that do not belong to
the same source file under analysis. In this case, constructor points to an external function.
Listing 4.5 illustrates another false-positive case that reports unflushed stores when
function hm rp rebuild returns. The function rebuilds the hashmap to extend its capacity, and it
only flushes NVMM stores if the whole rebuild process succeeds. If function entries cache
fails by returning -1, the program continues from rebuild error and does not flush. Having
unflushed stores is fine in this case because the progam cannot access the modified NVMM data
if the rebuild action fails.
We find 12 source files result in false-positives of the static analyzer from 66 totally
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analyzed ones. To suppress these false alarms, we plan to provide Clang command-line options
to prune execution paths that involve external functions or when a callee returns failure code.
1 static int hm_rp_rebuild(/* args */) {
2 if (entries_cache(pop, &hashmap_rebuld , ..) == -1)
3 goto rebuild_err;
4 pmemobj_persist(/* args */);
5 ...
6 rebuild_error:
7 // no flush action
8 }
Listing 4.5: False-positive 2: PmemConjurer reports unflushed stores when entries cache
fails and the program continues from rebuild error. But the consistency of these stores does
not affect correctness.
The dynamic analyzer did not produce any false-positives, although the code in Listing 4.5
could lead one.
4.6 Related Work
In this section, we discuss related approaches for detecting NVMM programming errors
and compare them with PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer.
PMemCheck [45] is a Valgrind [76] extension aiming to find recovery bugs for NVMM
programs using PMDK. It employs Valgrind’s binary instrumentation to trace all NVMM accesses,
cache flushes, logging routines and analyze their relations. It does not require annotating source
files or instrumenting the target during compilation. But it relies on Valgrind’s emulation layer to
trap these operations from a running binary, incuring large performance penalty. Moreover, it
also executes all threads in serial and omits interactions between threads. PMReorder [81] uses
store traces collected by PMemCheck to perform store ordering analysis as PmemSanitizer does.
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In contrast to PmemSanitizer, it requires the user annotating source files about what stores to
reorder, and it can only start testing after a target program terminates.
Yat [55] is a validation framework designed for evaluating the PMFS [22] file system. It
runs PMFS using a hypervisor called Hypersim and records memory traces between memory
barrier instructions. Then, it reorders stores to NVMM and replays them to emulate crashes. Yat
exhaustively tests all permutations of all subsets of stores between two memory barriers. The fact
of using a virtual machine environment and the exhaustive testing strategy makes it very slow,
limiting its applicability to other NVMM applications.
PMTest [60] provides two low-level checkers for verifying store persistence and ordering.
It also instruments libpmemobj’s TX BEGIN and TX END functions to check if stores of a trans-
action have been logged. Currently, PMTest requires the user manually instrumenting NVMM
stores in the source code, thus demanding more effort to delpoy than PMemCheck, PmemCon-
jurer or PmemSanitizer. PMTest can adopt PmemSanitizer’s compiler-instrumentation for better
automation. On the other hand, PmemSanitizer can provide PMTest’s low-level checkers for the
programmer to better describe persistence requirements.
4.7 Conclusion
We presented PmemConjurer and PmemSanitizer, tools for detecting recovery bugs that
challenge NVMM programming. To our knowledge, PmemConjurer provides the first static
analyzer for recovery bugs and proves symbolic execution is a viable solution to tackle this
challenge. PmemSanitizer’s dynamic analysis also introduces methods for analyzing multi-
threaded NVMM programs and performing store-reordering tests in a more convenient way than
existing approaches.
Our evaluation shows the effectiveness of our tool by detecting various real-life recovery
bugs in the PMDK repository. Although we have been targeting the libpmem and libpmemobj
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libraries to define NVMM-specific programming rules, we expect to derive similar rules for other
NVMM programming libraries, and adapt our program analysis techniques for them.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis presented NOVA-Fortis, Pangolin, PmemConjurer, and PmemSanitizer to
explore the unique challenges that improving PMEM software’s reliability presents. We expect
their design and implementation to benefit the development of reliable software for future
computing platforms with persistent memory.
NOVA-Fortis provides strong protection for its metadata using a full replication. It also
protects file data using space-efficient parity when user-space applications access files using
the read() and write() system calls. NOVA-Fortis can benefit many applications that already
use file system interfaces for accessing storage. When applications memory-map a PMEM file,
NOVA-Fortis has to disable its file data protection because DAX-style mmap() bypasses the file
system. DAX-mmap() provides fast access to durable data from the user-space, but it also exposes
user-space software to explicitly handling PMEM errors.
To facilitate the protection of memory-mapped persistent data, the Pangolin library
provides high-performance, crash-consistent, and fault-tolerant library functions to access PMEM.
Pangolin uses a novel, space-efficient layout of data and parity to protect arbitrary-sized PMEM
objects combined with per-object checksums to detect corruption.
NOVA-Fortis and Pangolin demonstrate that PMEM file systems and programming li-
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braries can make reliability and availability guarantees while providing high performance and
supporting DAX-style mmap(). They also make a clear case for developing unique reliability
mechanisms for PMEM rather than blithely adopting schemes used by conventional disk-based
storage systems.
Applications that do not use NOVA-Fortis or Pangolin may implement explicit manage-
ment of crash-consistency and fault-tolerance. They can adapt the techniques we described in
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 for their specific fault-tolerance needs. To catch recovery bugs, Pmem-
Conjurer helps programmers detect them early in the development stage, without compiling the
program to binary or executing it. As a complementary tool, PmemSanitizer provides compiler
instrumentation and run-time reordering tests for checking a PMEM application’s reliability in the
testing phase. Our evaluation showed the effectiveness of our debugging tools by detecting various
real-life recovery bugs in the PMDK repository. We expect PMEM application developers to
adopt these tools in their development flow or use the program analysis techniques for developing
alternative debugging tools.
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